

THE CENTRAL REPORT OF THE NINTH REGIONAL CONGRESS JUNE 1982

PROLOGUE

Between the Eighth Regional Congress —January 1974, and the Ninth Regional Congress— June 1982, the Arab Baath Socialist Party and its Revolution in Iraq passed through a long stage full of notable events and great achievements.

The phase preceding the Eighth Regional Congress was mainly devoted to establishing the revolutionary government, maintaining national unity, waging battles of steadfastly against the conspiracies of colonialist and reactionary forces and advancing, though with difficulty, along the path of defining the identity of the Party and Revolution after a long period of setbacks, disintegration, deviation, and distortions.

However, the phase that had followed the Eighth Regional Congress was, for the Revolution, a phase of stability, continuity and achievement in all fields.

The Eighth Regional Congress has been truly distinguished among the central Party conferences that preceded it. One of its most important characteristics is that it produced a comprehensive analysis for the phase that had preceded it, and laid down a comprehensive programme for the following one. In all this, the congress has sought to create a relation based on consciousness and interaction between the revolutionary principles and the concrete objective reality. It was also concerned to be fair and precise in its analysis of the previous phase.

Although this may seem natural, it had not been so in the past. In the experience of the movement of Arab Revolution and in those of previous experiments of the Party, conferences and similar activities had failed to act with such revolutionary and realistic precision and fairness. For, these aspects combined demand an extraordinary effort, a genuine adherence to principles, level-headedness, appropriate subjective conditions inside the Party and appropriate objective conditions as well. To make a comprehensive analysis of a preceding phase is not that easy for two basic considerations. The first is that such a process is very complicated since it involves so many ideological, economic, social and psychological elements that it is not easy to encompass them, or to deduct from them correct conclusions which are convincing to the masses and the Party and constitute a factor of integration among their ranks.

The second is the great difficulty in (a) striking a balance between criticism of mistakes and drawbacks within the preceding course without drifting into a disruptive or destructive trend with all subjective purposes that are sometime involved; and (b) extracting elements of positiveness and strength from that course, keeping the flame of revolutionary work burning, maintaining optimism, and opening up bright prospects before the members of the Party and the people as a whole.

In this, the Eighth Regional Congress has attained prominent success. The congress itself has contributed to making the following phase distinguished by, among other aspects, stability, unity and clarity in the ideological, political and organisational fields as never before in the life of the Party. The congress has given the Party a comprehensive, precise, fair and unanimous analysis for the preceding phase, as well as a comprehensive, revolutionary, realistic and unanimous programme for the following one.

With the central political report of that congress, the Party and the people had a central document defining the programme of action in all fields. Hence, the Party members and the people had become more able than before to pursue the Revolution's aims.

The citizen, who believes in the principles of the Party and Revolution and feels that they fulfill his aspirations and interests, has become more capable of interaction with the Party and of contribution to the revolutionary process which it is initiating.

This is a great achievement in revolutionary action. When the will and efforts of the revolutionary men of struggle get together in the framework of a clear and convincing programme, and when this programme is understood and supported by the people, great achievements will be quite possible. This had been exactly the case in the phase between the Eighth and Ninth Congresses.

The preceding phase had been distinguished by Comrade Saddam Hussein's assumption of the official forward position in the Party and State on July 16, 1979. Ever since the beginning, it had become increasingly known among the people that it is Comrade Saddam Hussein who leads the Party and Revolution, defines its main directions, solves its difficulties and faces the serious dangers besetting it. However, this had been done within a party and constitutional formula involving many difficulties and complications. Therefore, the last part of the preceding phase, beginning with President Hussein's official assumption of the forward responsibility up to the convocation of this congress was characterised by more clarity in defining objectives and concepts and with a higher capacity for decision-making, decisive action, facing dangers and conspiracies, and with the ability to push forward the course (of Revolution). In this period, we can objectively and sincerely say that the true face of the Party and its revolutionary experiment in Iraq has become totally clear on the largest scale. The experiment itself has started to move forward in accordance with its natural course possessing the highest ability to face external and internal dangers.

Today the Ninth Regional Congress is held amid a general feeling within the Party as well as among the people that the Revolution's permanent motto launched by Comrade Saddam Hussein, «let us move forward* has been achieved and has become a reality in the life of the Party and the people in every field and in every part of the society.

The prevailing general feeling is one of strength, determination, optimism, and great confidence in the future, but not because the present situation does not hold dangers and difficulties. On the contrary, it has been full of the gravest dangers and sensitive issues, in the forefront of which are the aggression of the Iranian regime against the homeland, and

the escalation of the Zionist entity's aggression to a very grave level demonstrated by its raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor on June 7, 1981 and its invasion of Lebanon in June 1982.

Rather, this feeling is the outcome of profound and realistic confidence that the Party and the Revolution have become so powerful that they have become able to face every danger and difficulty and have become highly capable of achieving their aims.

The Party members and the people are now called upon to work meticulously and earnestly and to fight courageously under the banner of the Party, Revolution and the leadership of President Saddam Hussein.

The Party members and the people look at the Ninth Regional Congress as a new and vigorous starting point within the course of the Revolution and the Party. The essential task of this Congress was to define the main aspects of the preceding phase, to analyse it in a comprehensive, precise and fair manner, and to lay down a revolutionary, realistic and comprehensive programme that responds to both the present circumstances with all their dangers and complications, and the following phase which we are anticipating.

There is nothing new or surprising in many aspects of the analysis made by the Congress. For, the preceding phase between the Eighth Congress and this one had been distinguished from past phases by the flourishing ideological activity especially by Comrade Saddam Hussein and with his constant endeavour to analyse basic phenomena, lay down solutions for new problems, treat existing difficulties, face dangers in all its forms, and develop the Ba'athist Theory of Action in various fields of life.

The Congress has, therefore, devoted most of its efforts to sum up the process of definition and analysis of the previous phase and formulating it in a central Party document with the addition of new elements derived from the experiment itself as well as from life.

The programme of the Party and Revolution in the next phase is certainly an extension to their permanent programme which is based on principles. However, it will be interacting with new conditions; present and future dangers besetting the homeland, Party and Revolution; and newly discovered facts. It will also sincerely and scientifically try to interact with the ever forward-moving tempo of life.

The pattern of this report is:

a) To give a general picture of the internal life of the Party and the subjective conditions of the Revolution in the last phase and to review the main aspects of the historic role of the Leadership of President Saddam Hussein in the process of building up the Party after the 1963 November apostasy (against the Ba'ath Party), in the launching of the Revolution on July 17-30, 1968 and in its steadfastness and growth up to the present remarkable level.

- b) To review the political, economic, social and other aims drawn out by the Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress, define what had been and what had not been achieved and explain relevant reasons and circumstances.
- c) To review the ideas and trends contained in the Political Report of the Eighth Congress in the light of the experience acquired by the Party throughout its past course and the theoretical and practical discoveries it has made.
- d) To define the ideas, trends, and the basic aims of the next phase in the light of the principles of the Party, its conditions, its present capabilities, the present capabilities of the Revolution and the people, its lively and rich experience, the newly discovered facts of life, the grave dangers besetting the homeland, the Party and the Revolution, and the present objective conditions on the local, national Arab and international levels.

INTRODUCTION

Between the 24th and the 27th of June 1982, the Ninth Regional Congress was held in Baghdad.

Comrade Saddam Hussein, the Regional Command Secretary, opened the congress with an instructive address to the members of the congress. He said: «In this session, and because of the special circumstances through which the Revolution and great Iraq are living and because of the testing time through which you have passed, you can be rightly considered as the vanguard of the Party, the heroes of our great people, its living conscience, its ever vigilant eyes and its voice to show the way ahead which should never fall silent when a sincere word is needed and which should not grow weak when a clear and vigorous voice is needed».

He added: «On the occasion of holding this congress I would like to greet the comrades, members of the Regional Congress, and express my pleasure at holding this congress. I would like also to extend my cordial congratulations to the comrades who won the confidence of their comrades in lower Party ranks so as to represent the Party in its conscience and ideology through this congress. I hope and am fully confident that you will be worthy of the high opinion held of you, and of the confidence in which you are held, through which you are shouldering great direct and indirect responsibility. Such responsibility has rightly taken its course, which is to pave the way for future aspirations and tasks in a manner suggesting confidence and security through your practice of your proper duties».

On choosing leaders through election, Comrade Hussein said: «The choice should be made among Party members who are better qualified in terms of struggle and absolute faith in principles and people». He defined the conditions he considered necessary for choosing Regional Command members as: (1) Greater courage in confronting crises than that required in ordinary conditions. The most important factor in the courage I mean is

the courageous decision based on absolute faith in the cause of the struggle of the Party and people, despite all changes and confusion.

(2) Absolute honesty towards whatever may be in excess of the need of balanced life and the legitimate future requirements of the Baathist member and his family.

(3) The candidate's desire to work meticulously to put into practice the Party's principles from his own position in the Party, State and society. Therefore, traditional supervision and control is necessary for the Party ranks below that of the highest leadership and not for the members of this leadership. The basis in the adherence of the members of the leadership to these rules is not therefore supposed to result from the supervision of the Regional Secretary. Rather, the Baathist conscience and the honour and responsibility of leadership should be the main supervisor on the Regional Command members at all times and conditions. Then the Regional Secretary can fully practice his directing, leading and educational role besides his other tasks.

(4) Absolute faith in the importance and necessity of the independence of Iraq and the Party in a manner that would immunise our revolutionary experiment against interference and mischief of external foreign and Arab trends.

(5) Firmness of faith and character in the attitude towards international ideological trends as well as retrogressive trends, considering the Party's ideology of the Party as the only one capable of paving for the Baathist the way he believes in, and in accordance with which all things should be assessed.*

Comrade Hussein added in his address to the congress members: «Dear Comrades, Your Party and Revolution has offered the people, the homeland and the nation what no other experiment has been able to do within such a relatively short period. However, we have to say that the most acute defect which we have to warn against is that the enemies of the Revolution and the Party managed in the past stage to influence and recruit a few young Iraqis —some of whom are of poor families with which the Revolution had been very generous. I know the size of the international and regional forces acting against the Revolution and I know the reasons behind their fervent endeavour as well.

Moreover, I know that when we reconsider these reasons we shall abandon our principled attitudes and the interests of our great people —which it will never occur to us to do even partially.

However, I think, if we had worked and thought in the Party on all levels as we had to, we would have foiled all hostile plans in this field. The enemies would have won less devious elements from among social sections which are supposed to support the Party and the Revolution.

The Revolution and its leader-Party have offered the people what it never dreamt of attaining in such a short time. Therefore, what can hostile forces say to certain sections of the population to win them over, however small the number of recruited elements may

be? Can they say «Join us to work against the Revolution which has fed the hungry, clothed the poor and provided social security for all; pensions for the family which lost its father, orphans, widows, the handicapped, the mentally ill and the aged?»

The Revolution and its Leadership have scrutinised the smallest aspects of social life and living conditions of the people. It enacted laws; the most prominent among them is the Social Security Law. Human vision has characterized its treatment of issues related to the workers; the peasants; the military; the Women and their social and legal position, and the family, motherhood, and childhood with all their requirements.

The Revolution has built up a vigorous and prosperous Iraq which has acquired a high standing on the Arab and international levels.

It has made great achievements: the oil nationalisation, the autonomy (to the Iraqi Kurds in Northern Iraq), the National Front and a considerable progress in culture, education and all other fields.

If such is the case —and it is actually so to a great extent— the enemies' success in winning over certain groups which, in terms of revolutionary technical assessment are considered part of the people, testifies to a defect for which the Party, in the areas and levels concerned, bears responsibility.

The most prominent aspect of this defect is the deficiency in the principled and ideological immunity of certain Party officials or their lack of ability and efficiency in expressing the Party's principles in procedure and methods, as well as their failure to discover the enemies' methods and nature and to provide the necessary means of educating the members of the public and the Party lower ranks.

Our enemies' method at this stage is based on promoting backward and retrogressive religious and social concepts and habits. They resort to arousing instincts along these lines with a view to facilitating counter-revolutionary action. Their methods are coloured with deceit, humbug, swindling and lies in view of the requirements of psychological warfare and its aims.

The basis of our confrontation of the enemies lies in maintaining a genuinely close relationship with the people; uncovering the enemies' methods; defining the information and facts and making them available to the people; and exposing these methods and their ends with the most effective methods directly or indirectly.

Primarily and as a basic task of struggle, we have to begin with immunising our families, friends and acquaintances against the effect of counter-trends. Consequently, we shall turn this section of the people not only to a position beyond the negative influence of the counter forces, but also to a group actively involved in educating and fortifying the people on the largest scale so as to ward off the enemies' counter-revolutionary methods and propaganda.

The members of the Party organisation which has now covered every part of the country must be actually believing in principles and expressing them in practice without weakness or hesitation.

To ensure such a level, our basic yardsticks in assessing sincerity in work and thinking should take into consideration that Party members assuming State responsibilities should work objectively, efficiently and justly. They should sincerely apply whatever programmes, laws and instructions they have to apply. The assessment should also be based on the consideration that the number of hostile, disloyal and lazy elements in the areas of their work or in their offices should diminish with time; and that the rate of sincerity and efficiency in the quarter where those Party members work should increase with time.

If this cannot be achieved, we have to consider those Party members insincere or at least unqualified for their jobs—which demand, in the least, a change of their responsibilities and a replacement by more efficient elements. If they are insincere, there shall be a different way of dealing with them.

In Party responsibilities, we have to measure the sincerity and efficiency of Party members in the provinces and other administrative divisions on the basis of the decrease in the number of the enemies of the Revolution and the Party, and the shrinking of the negative circle among the people in every province; as well as on the basis of the increase in the support of the masses to the Revolution and the Party and in their consciousness and ideological and moral immunity in accordance with the Party's principles and standards in every stage.

In these concepts, we proceed from our precise knowledge that the Iraqis have now become more homogenous socially and psychologically, or more close to each other.

If differences increase between one area and another, in terms of loyalty to the Party and the Revolution's course, the defect must be within the Party's organisation itself. In the light of these concepts, we have to watch the various phenomena; to undertake our revolutionary duties in building up the state, Party and society; to confront the enemies and to assess Party members, the people and friends. In accordance with these concepts, I will deal with the comrades, each by his own responsibility.

Comrades, the difficulties confronting the Revolution may seem to you extraordinary ones. This is quite true and expected because the Revolution led by the Party is not considered ordinary by many people. Equally, the men assuming the honour and responsibility of leadership in this Revolution have to be of extraordinary nature. We are called upon to compete for such a high honour through sacrifice, meticulous work and inexhaustible patience. The Revolution which does not confront serious difficulties cannot prepare its men who are eager to maintain its flourishing contribution and who are capable of defending it in all stages and under all circumstances.

Comrades, if your revolution had not faced the difficulties it had actually faced, can you theoretically imagine what sort of a relationship you would have with the people, yourselves and your principles? Your Revolution would have turned into a regime alienating you as well as the people; disappointment would have prevailed; hopes would have been lost; those believing in the necessity of the Revolution's continuity in accordance with its original standards and concepts would have become a minority, while those corrupted with worn-out modes of life—which are full of deceit, flabbiness and social corruption— would have become the majority. Such a regime would have its own men while the Revolution's men would have been divided into two groups: those who would have sought to protect their Revolution and reject the alternative regime, and those who would have failed to have the appropriate vision and behaviour, consequently surrendering to and joining such a regime. Thus, the Revolution would have lost its historic role; the people would have lost their great hopes; and he who would have wanted to continue along the path of Revolution would have been forced to start struggle anew whether through our Party or another.

If our Party had not faced hard conditions of struggle in the early phases of its rise, would it have been able to make a revolution such as the July Revolution, or would it rather have turned into another Party quite different from the Party we have known and joined?

Thus, Comrades, the wide base of Baathists and other citizens who can meet the conditions of underground struggle has expanded. The number of Party members has now become thousands of thousands, while in the past there were only hundreds of them. The difficulties which have faced the Revolution, in the forefront of which is the Second Qadissiya battle, have solved the problem of making a choice between the desire to expand the base of the Party and the fear that expansion in recruitment might create a burden to the Party and open the door for its enemies to infiltrate its structure with a view to destroying it from within. In terms of education and struggle, these hard conditions played a special role in building up the Party and people in a most reliable manner that ensures both the present and the future.

Among the ranks of the people, there was an increase in the number of fighters and builders who have gained through such difficult conditions more experience, firmness, awareness and extraordinary potential for work and sacrifice.

Had not been for this, the Party's main body which, had grown after the Revolution would have collapsed or deviated.

After the Revolution, and especially in recent years, the Party was faced with an extremely difficult condition. There were two alternatives, the first being that the Party should remain a small organisation with only limited additions from among the people. In such a case, the Party would be isolated from the people who would be for various reasons an easy prey for hostile forces. This is obviously a suicide for the reasons we have already mentioned as well as for other reasons concerning the expansion in the tasks of the Party in the State and society and human need for renovation. These needs demand an expansion in the Party's organisation. The other alternative is to open the Party for the

people and expand its organisation without the presence of the conditions, tasks and difficulties of underground struggle which enrich the standards of sincerity, speed the building-up of the member's character and strengthen and deepen the basis of new traditions. In such a case, the Party would sustain a cancer tumor and commit a special form of suicide.

Hence, the war which is one of the hardest conditions confronting the Revolution has turned, in one of its side effects, to a need and an indispensable means not only to defend Iraq against invaders but also to build up great Iraq in accordance with the concepts of the Party and the Revolution, expand the base of the Baathist struggle, deepen the awareness of the people of its historic responsibilities, and enhance its patience and faith in the Revolution's course after it had spilled its blood in defence of the Revolution and its principles.

Therefore, the sacrifices we have made in this valiant battle are a small price compared with what Iraq and the Revolution's course of progress would have lost had we surrendered to the state of flabbiness, humiliation and hesitation to meet hard challenges.*

The Leader Saddam Hussein concluded by saying:

«Comrades, I believe that the faithful human being who enjoys a conscious and firm will, can do everything outside the range of God's tasks. Hence, I see that we will inevitably achieve our aims, God willing, that the enemies will no doubt fall one after another, that all conspiracies hatched against Iraq and its progress would be smashed as were former ones, and that our great people led by our Party of struggle would be victorious in this as well as in all future battles for new life, God willing.

In the end, I hope every success for your honest task of struggle in your historic role in this Congress. I also trust that you, each from his own position, will continue your tasks of struggle after this Congress with vigour, faith, patience, and a high-principled attitude. May God make your efforts a success. Thank you.»

The Congress has dwelt upon the Central Report put forward for discussion by the Regional Command, and enriched it with recommendations and notes. The Congress had asked the Regional Command to prepare the Report for publication in the light of its recommendations, notes and any developments that may take place between the Congress' meetings and its publication.

The Party's Regional Command is pleased to present the Central Report approved by the Ninth Regional Congress to the members of the Party, the people and the nation.

The Regional Command

January, 1983

Chapter I

THE INTERNAL LIFE AND SUBJECTIVE

CONDITIONS IN THE PARTY

AND REVOLUTION

The Party's internal life and the Revolution's subjective conditions constitute an essential factor in defining their ability to perform their tasks and in shaping the features of the stage which they are leading. It may not be always possible to talk in public about the internal life and subjective conditions of the Party and the Revolution. The Leadership may sometimes be forced to close certain chapters or not to reveal certain aspects even in terms of internal dealings with the Party and its main leading bodies. In so doing, it is not prompted by a desire to retain the right of withholding certain facts which it does not want the Party base to be informed about.

To raise an issue at the wrong time and the untimely revelation of a certain fact may cause harmful consequences to the progress of the Party and Revolution —of which the enemies may unwarrantedly make use. This method in dealing with the internal life of the Party and the subjective conditions of the Revolution with all patience —which may sometimes reach a degree of bitterness— involved, stems from the Party's bitter experiences before the Revolution of July 17-30, 1968. In such experiences, when the Party members and leaders in particular, could not handle the realities of the internal life and the subjective conditions of the Revolution, squabbles were created, crises intensified with no objective reason in most cases, and conflicts erupted. Hostile forces made great use of this in dealing a blow to the whole Party and to the whole Revolution. This was exactly what happened on November 18, 1963 in Iraq, and to a certain extent on February 23, 1966 in Syria.

The Central Report of the Ninth Regional Congress

Of all past experiments of power by the Baath Party in Iraq and Syria, those of the movement of Arab revolution in particular and those of the movement of revolution in the Third World at large, the experiment of July 17-30, 1968 Revolution is distinguished by its remarkable success in realising continuity, maturity and progress. However, this does not mean that it has not suffered from bitter, even serious difficult subjective

conditions. Indeed, it has suffered from all of this, yet it has stood up to the challenge, continued, gained maturity and kept moving forward.

Our own experience for scores of years in the Party, also other revolutionary experiences in the world, have shown us that such an achievement must not only have its own objective conditions and prerequisites. The leaders themselves may play a decisive role, whether in helping conditions to drift into crisis then on to dispute and open conflict, or in facing difficulties with perseverance and patience and dealing with complicated cases with wisdom, high morality, great courage and systematic effectiveness with a view to protecting the progress of the experiment from collapse or weaknesses and to maintaining and constantly enhancing its advance. This was exactly the case with the experiment of the July 17-30, 1968 Revolution where the historic role of leader Saddam Hussein lies.

Objectivity and sincerity towards the Party and Revolution, the people, and the whole movement of Arab revolution, demand at this stage that we should deal with this fact. This is not only because of our desire to be fair to history only —though this is necessary by itself— but also to understand the essence of the past course of the Party and Revolution; to solve certain puzzles in our minds as members of the Party; and to apprehend many complications which had baffled us. Above all, this will help us move forward with more clarity, depth and ability to achieve the aims of our Party and Revolution and to serve our people and nation.

As men of struggle, we remember those dark and hazardous days which the Party endured in the aftermath of November 18, 1963 conspiracy and the state of confusion, loss and shaken confidence in which we lived. We had at the time, and sometimes conflicting evaluations of the reasons for the setback. About this, a great deal was written by the Party, and many documents were centrally published. However, despite confusion and differences in interpretation and evaluation, we, as men of struggle, feel that one —or even the most— important reason behind the setback, is the Party's lack, at the time, of a Baathist leader with inter-related qualities —adherence to principles, wisdom, courage, morality, patience, strategic mind, tactical ability— who can rally the Baathists, mobilise their tremendous potentialities, make use of their remarkable preparedness for meticulous action and sacrifice, solve differences and contradictions, define priorities, explain difficulties and confront enemies at the right time and place.

This is what we had been all agreed to at the time. In those complex conditions, we, as Party members, felt the dire and profound need for such an indispensable factor.

Amid those bitter, difficult and complex conditions «the leader — necessity» had emerged. Comrade Saddam Hussein is not of the sort of leader who emerges all of a sudden as is the case with military coups; nor is he of the sort of leader who is built up throughout a very long process and gets known before assuming power, as is the case with parties and movements which operate in public or semi-public conditions.

He is a unique model who emerged and developed in unique conditions. The Party's activity and organisation were under-ground because any form of public activity would

prompt a crushing, oppressive blow to its organisation. Internal life in the Party was then very limited. Time was very short and fast running out.

The conspiracy of November 18, 1963 was accompanied and followed by dissension in Iraq's party organisation. Within weeks, dissension hit the Party's national organisation (in the Arab homeland). Less than a year later, an extensive blow was dealt to the Party on September 4, 1964, and Comrade Saddam Hussein was arrested. In February 1966, an apostate coup overthrew the Party's government in Syria.

Despite those conditions, the Baathists who were closely attached to Party's internal life were quite aware of the role of Comrade Saddam Hussein at that stage. Indeed, they remember the picture of that courageous Baathist youth who carried out the Party's orders, took up a rifle and shot at dictator Abdul Karim Qassim. They knew him in exile in Egypt as a committed, courageous and serious Baathist. Moreover they remember him as the bright Baathist who used to speak the truth with all clarity, courage and frankness in the Party's Regional and National conferences, during the experiment of the February Revolution 1963. They had just seen him shouldering the responsibility of reorganising the Party in a courageous, meticulous and faithful manner. Further, they were aware that he had taken the basic role in preparing a plan of revolution and all its requirements in the hope of striking at Abdul Salam Arif's regime in September 1964; and they knew how he courageously fought off the attempt to arrest him.

These are all signs of birth. After his escape from prison on July 23, 1966, the Baathists felt that his presence again among them in the Party had given them more strength and ability to confront the new dissension resulting from the February conspiracy (in Syria) as well as in rebuilding the Party and expanding its base.

Indeed, the Party warded off the danger of dissension, restored its unity and expanded its organisational base. It has, in effect, become the prime leader of the people's struggle in Iraq and the prime candidate for a revolutionary change much waited for.

However, launching a revolution against the Arif regime and assuming power were much more complicated than the Party's internal life and its means of struggle. They had different needs and conditions and involved stages and difficulties which had to be overcome.

The Eighth Regional Congress has dealt with some aspects of the conditions and needs emerging in that phase, but it has not tackled them with necessary clarity, especially with regard to the Party's internal life and the Revolution's subjective conditions.

In talking today about the Revolution, 14 years after its launching, we are prompted by a sense of precision as well as by faithfulness to the Party and history to say that July 17 was a Revolution in essence and intentions. However, from a practical point of view, it was a «draft revolution», and July 30 itself was the «revolution» under which we are today living and whose course we are pursuing.

Had it not been for the operation of July 30, 1968, the change of July 17, 1968 would have been a military coup of a rightist and reformist nature rather than being a comprehensive and radical revolution. If the counter-revolutionary elements (Abdul Razzak al-Naief, Abdul Rahman al-Dawood and others) had managed to control the situation, the change of July 17, 1968 would have in effect turned into a counter-revolution; the Party would have suffered a crackdown; and all the people's aspirations for freedom, progress, independence and revival would have suffered a fatal blow.

In preparing for July 17, Comrade Saddam Hussein was the mind that had planned organised and taken precautions. In the morning of July 17, he, a civilian Baathist, had driven the first tank and stormed the Republican Palace, thus triggering off the Revolution.

However, on July 30, Saddam Hussein was indeed the Revolution's Leader. It was he who insisted on liquidating the counter-revolutionary forces and that very soon. It was he who devised the plan, chose the time of execution, designated the roles of participants and himself dealt the decisive blow. Hence the true birth of the Revolution —which brought forth the course through which we are living today.

The Arab Baath Socialist Party, especially in Iraq and Syria, has proved more than once, within the context of long experience, its capability of assuming power. This was not an acute problem for the Party as was the case with some Arab parties which have grown old without assuming power. The Party has always had courageous civilian and military members capable of striking at this or that regime and assuming power partly or totally. But, for the Party, the essential and historical problem had always been how to remain in office, and how to protect the Baathist identity of its government and its forward movement along the path of continuity, maturity and influence on the movement of Arab Revolution.

If Comrade Saddam Hussein had a leading and strategic role in the Party's assumption of power on July 17-30, 1968, he, since July 30, 1968, has been in effect, the first leader in the process of maintaining power, confirming the Baathist identity of the Revolution's government and progressing along the path of continuity, maturity and influence.

The prime revolutionary and historic achievement which has been realised, thanks to Comrade Hussein's leadership and the awareness of the Party and its senior cadres is that, through a revolutionary, semi-peaceful, intelligent, complex and patient though firmly principled process, he was able to prevent the predominance of the military coup phenomenon over the Revolution even after July 30, and to maintain the identity of the Revolution as one led by our Party.

Some senior military Party members, or those who were so considered as a result of their personal ambition and their lack of Party and revolutionary awareness had no idea in historical, popular and Baathist terms for the process and role of a revolution led by the Party in an individual Arab country as a base for the movement of Arab revolution. For them, the Revolution was mainly an act of revenge against those who has usurped power

from the Party of November 18, 1963. For them, it was also an upper change of a reformist and superficial nature which, in the Arab homeland experiments, and those of the Third World, always results in a rightist regime incapable of achieving the aims of the radical, democratic, social and cultural revolution and of maintaining the necessary requirements of confronting imperialism, Zionism and reactionary forces.

Such an option (the reformist and superficial political change) was of course impossible with the Party participating in power in one form or another. It is totally rejected by the Party. Had it not been for the historic leadership which had led the process of ensuring the Party, Baathist and revolutionary identity of the government, as we have just mentioned, a divorce and an explosion would have certainly taken place between the Party and those military men; the Party might have disintegrated into many conflicting and contradictory trends; most Baathists would have been deeply disappointed and driven to despair; the whole experiment with all its components might have fallen; and the black counter-revolution would have returned, as was the case on November 18, 1963.

The second historic achievement which was secured, thanks to Comrade Saddam Hussein's leadership and to the courage and vigilance of the Party members, was the total success in crushing all conspiracies hatched against the Party by colonialist and reactionary forces, adventurers, rancorous political groups, the Syrian regime, the Communist Party, the Shah's regime and its local agents, as well as those conspiracies hatched from within the Party itself.

This is in no way an ordinary achievement. Rather, it is a historic one in view of Iraq's difficult and complex conditions: political fragmentation resulting from the conflicts which started with July 14, 1958 and continued up to the Revolution of July 17, 1968; the insurgency in the north; the proximity to Iran; the monopolistic companies' control over our basic resources; the growing foreign ambitions in our country; and the demographic and social multiplicity. Indeed, it is a great achievement, especially considering that it was made within the framework of the continuing revolutionary process, its progress and maturity as well as within the widest possible democratic practice and developing relationship with the people.

We remember those days when Comrade Saddam Hussein was modestly, relentlessly, patiently working behind the scenes within the framework of an establishment of whose name or position a very few had heard, i.e., the Bureau of Public Relations, while he was in effect leading the revolutionary process with all its complications. While officially occupying the position of Deputy Secretary of the Party's Regional Command, he was, in effect, the Vice-Chairman of the Revolution Command Council. In those days, through very simple means and with the participation of few courageous Baathists, the Revolution's security was attended to under the supervision of Comrade Saddam Hussein. Hence the foiling of one conspiracy after another, and the extensive liquidation of Zionist, American, British and Iranian espionage rings as well as those linked to covetous forces with ambitions in Iraq, Masonic cells, and the groups of adventurous and power-thirsty army officers who were collaborating with this or that State.

Much of that active, delicate and dangerous work was done secretly. Nothing was declared except when the Revolution's interests so demanded, as was the case with the foiling of the reactionary conspiracy in 1970, and other attempts of which the public was informed. Ever since the beginning, all enemies of the Party and all hostile intelligence services have identified the role of Comrade Saddam Hussein in defending the Revolution. Indeed, they have taken into consideration that no plot can succeed without aiming at the leader Saddam Hussein.

When direct foreign attempts on the Revolution failed, hostile forces started to hatch conspiracies against the Party and Revolution from within. Hence, Comrade Saddam Hussein was target No. 1 in such conspiracies. In confronting such a dangerous and delicate type of conspiracy, he was also in the forefront. We all remember those delicate hours of 1973 June conspiracy which was hatched by a number of members of the leadership with a view to imposing their hegemony over the Party and Revolution and forcing on them an ideologically and morally alien conduct with all the connections with hostile colonialist forces, the Shah regime, forces of reaction and the Syrian regime involved.

The Party, thus, was in a historic need of an iron hand to strike swiftly and with no hesitation whatsoever. It also needed a more delicate scalpel to distinguish between tiny vessels of conspiracy and those of confusion which involved a number of members who had certain links with the conspirators and might have taken part in some of their activities but did not share their ends. At those moments, the Party was in need of a leader of a special type who could cut out a cancer but keep the body alive, strong and capable of growth and work. Indeed, Comrade Saddam Hussein was this leader who has performed this task with a remarkable success. Had it not been for such treatment, the Party would have sunk in an internal war of liquidation. Dark clouds would have overwhelmed it and alien standards prevailed in its ranks, while its revolutionary experiment would have reached the brink of collapse or perhaps total collapse.

This was what happened in July 1979 when the treasonous and conspiratorial attitude of a group of members of the leadership and some senior cadres surfaced.

At those moments, the Party and its Revolution were at a serious crossroads. The aim of the conspirators was to obstruct the assumption by Comrade Saddam Hussein of his legitimate responsibilities in the forward position of leadership of the Party and Revolution and to throw the Party and Revolution into a state of confusion and disintegration so as to make the Revolution and consequently the whole country an easy prey for the shady Assad regime, the spiteful Iranian regime, foreign powers and the forces of reaction in the region. This would lead to the destruction of the Party and the

Revolution as well as to the shattering of all those good and honest hopes entertained by the Party members and honest patriots through decades of building up a national, revolutionary, fully independent, strong and democratic experiment which can become a liberated base for the movement of Arab revolution and a centre of influence and support for it.

It is necessary to dwell a little upon this evil attempt which, of all the long series of evil conspiracies and attempts on the Party and Revolution and on the leader Saddam Hussein and his historic role, was the severest blow ever dealt to them.

We have first to refer to the fact that in the aftermath of the 1973 June conspiracy, the Leadership was sincerely eager not to prosecute some Party members who had links with the conspirators, so as to create a positive atmosphere and offer positive opportunities to all in order that they can serve the Party and Revolution regardless of the complexes and circumstances of the past phase. This however had not cured all of them. Some had stored certain spiteful feelings and lived in personal complexes thus making themselves a medium for the evil conspiracy which was discovered in 1979.

Involved in this conspiracy were some members of the Leadership who had no right to claim as far as the leadership of the Party and Revolution is concerned. All of them have been offered chances to go up the ladder of leadership more than what they deserved, whether in terms of their history and role in the Party or their individual efficiency. Yet, they formed a ring which hid itself inside the Party and used means of distortion, deceit, machination, liquidation and intrigue with a view to defaming members of the Party and causing conflicts inside the Leadership and among senior cadres as a step towards controlling the Party and government through full coordination with the puppet regime of Syria and numerous foreign circles. All these parties have unanimously agreed on striking at the independent national, true socialist and incorruptible Baathist trend of which Comrade Saddam Hussein has been a bright and firm symbol. They were aiming at substituting for this trend, a state of affairs similar to those in Syria and certain other regimes where corruption reign in the highest circles of the State, and power centres with by foreign connections predominate. Prevailing these regimes also are slogans which are devoid of any real content and of any firm grounds on which Iraq and consequently the Arab nation can rest in confronting Imperialism, Zionism and all foreign powers with certain territorial ambitions in Iraq and the Arab nation.

The Party has succeeded in discovering and smashing that malicious conspiracy and in punishing the conspirators for their conspiracy, treason and dishonesty, and rightly so.

At those moments too, Comrade Saddam Hussein has managed through his brilliant qualities of leadership and his high sense of morality to cut out cancer while keeping the body alive and strong.

Despite the bitterness of the conspiracy, a sense of strength and optimism has prevailed in the Party. Thus we are living today in conditions remarkably unique, not only in the

history of our “special” experiments, but also in that of the movement of revolution in the Arab homeland and the Third World.

Throughout the whole course of the Revolution and at all crossroads it has passed and in all its great achievements, Comrade Saddam Hussein has been in the foremost position: taking the initiative, planning, confronting difficulties and devising solutions.

In the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question—which we shall dwell upon in a special chapter—

Comrade Saddam Hussein took the initiative in putting forward a theoretic and political formula and in making contacts with Barzani's group at the time. On his own initiative, it was possible to make the March 11, 1980 Declaration which constituted the principled and political basis of the national settlement of the Kurdish question.

Comrade Saddam Hussein, ever since, and up to the achievement of the autonomy and the crushing of the reactionary insurgency, had been steering this complex process in all its theoretical, political, administrative, military security, economic and psychological aspects from his own position in the Leadership and in his capacity as Head of the Supreme Committee for North Affairs.

Comrade Saddam Hussein had led the process of establishing the National Front—which was explained in the Political Report of the Party's Eighth Regional Congress, and is particularly tackled in this report. He led the Supreme Committee of the Front, supervised all its basic activities and made a precise diagnosis of its problems—which we will tackle in the chapter on the Front.

Comrade Saddam Hussein had been the leader of the process of oil nationalisation—which is one great historic national achievement—in both strategic and tactical terms. From his own position in the Leadership and in his capacity as Chairman of the Follow-up Committee for Oil and Agreements Implementation Affairs, he devised a plan to persuade the monopolistic oil companies to come to negotiations. During the ultimatum given to these companies between May 17 and June 1, 1972, the day of historic nationalisation decree, President Saddam Hussein himself led the psychological, press and popular mobilisation campaign which led to nationalisation. It was he who had patiently, wisely and firmly faced the state of vacillation and fear which had preceded the decree. For long years, such a state of affairs had remained a secret to all but a few members of the Leadership. It was he who had led the long and difficult course of successfully, bringing about the nationalisation, and supervising its political, economic, information, psychological and even technical aspects. Through the same course, oil companies were forced to kneel down. Further, it was he who concluded the agreement with France—which had at the time a great effect in bringing the nationalisation to success and in breaking the blockade of monopolies.

Moreover, it was he who had laid down the firm and sound bases of the Iraqi oil policy which is today a remarkable model of sound independent policy in this field. And it was he who attended to its implementation until it became an established policy.

Comrade Saddam Hussein has been the prime planner of comprehensive development in Iraq—which is considered today the most remarkable experiment of development in the Arab homeland and in many Third World countries. Through his direct chairmanship of the Board of Planning and his constant concern for devising and implementing plans, and thanks to his distinguished method of leadership, he has changed the Board from a merely technical body into a political, economic and ideological forum where theories and experiments are discussed, and ideas are put forward and interact so as to reach a mature result.

It is Comrade Saddam Hussein who had laid down the strategy of nuclear research in Iraq. For many years, he headed the Nuclear Energy Commission. It was he who devised its strategic and tactical plans, concluded the main agreements with France and attended to this experiment which is one of the greatest achievements of the Revolution.

Despite the fact that Comrade Saddam Hussein, through certain circumstances and reasons, had not practised direct supervision over the armed forces and the Party's military organisation except for a short time in the early stages of the Revolution, he, from his own position in the Leadership and in the State had been urging, encouraging and sponsoring the process of developing the national armed forces through Party-related, patient, often difficult and complex methods. He showed a great concern for enhancing the combat efficiency of these forces; offering the necessary opportunities to efficient, bright and sincere officers; and promoting a sense of high appreciation for the role of the armed forces in protecting the Revolution, defending the homeland's sovereignty and contributing to national (Arab) battles. All this process had been carried out through the context of conscious and firm commitment to the Revolution, the Party's decisive leadership of the armed forces, respect for standards and traditions of Party work and their harmony with the necessary and right standards and traditions of the army. It was he who supervised the strategy of national military industrialisation and followed up its implementation.

In his capacity as Chairman of the Supreme Committee for North Affairs, Comrade Saddam Hussein had been—as we shall point out in the chapter on the Kurdish question—conducting, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, the general directions of the military operations against the reactionary insurgency. That was an excellent opportunity to promote the new ideas and methods in the Iraqi Army and in its battles. For it laid down general and important bases for building up the Iraqi armed forces under the Revolution, as an advanced and efficient force highly capable of discharging excellent combat duties under complex political conditions.

Comrade Saddam Hussein had been the leader and the educator in the field of thought, culture and information. He made the Party's Bureau of Information and Culture, which he has been heading, a remarkable school for Baathists working in this domain. The

sessions of this bureau have been, for the past years, first class ideological, political, cultural and information seminars.

Besides the leading officials in this field, many other senior cadres in the Party and State were attending these sessions —which helped develop them, deepen their experience and open up new and wide prospects for them.

Through such a formula, the Party's bodies of culture and information have developed.

Comrade Saddam Hussein has been himself attending to the creative poets, artists, writers and all other creative figures in this field who, through him, were inspired by the Revolution's thought and spirit and who expressed them through their own creations.

Comrade Saddam Hussein, who took the prime role in reorganising the Party before the Revolution, has continued this task ever since.

The revolutionary government's preoccupations and the numerous tasks he assumed have not distracted him from following up the Party's organisation affairs with a view to guarding its Baathist values and standards, providing the requirements of its ideological and practical development, protecting it from erroneous and devious trends and tendencies, establishing relations with the people on Baathist and democratic bases and expanding its popular base.

The Party members and senior cadres are very well aware of the high value of hundreds of meetings and seminars held by Comrade Saddam Hussein where he tackled all affairs of the Party and its organisation, by making instructions and explanations, outlining future prospects, and warning in a firm and principled manner against mistakes, drawbacks, bureaucracy and stagnation.

Throughout the past course with all its remarkable achievements and successes as well as its difficulties and bitterness, the Party members found in Comrade Saddam Hussein, a leader, a brother and a comrade who directs, sponsors, protects, salvages them from difficult and complex conditions and opens up for them the path of work, struggle and generous giving.

It was Comrade Saddam Hussein who, since the Revolution up to the present time, has been outlining the policy of the Party and Revolution in the national (Arab) and international fields. It was he who has always been taking the initiative in formulating the basic decisions in this domain.

He has precisely designed how to conduct relations with Arab countries while at the same time providing the appropriate conditions within the limits of available resources for the growth of the activity of the Party and the revolutionary people. At all national turning points, Comrade Saddam Hussein's view, analysis and proposals occupied the foremost

place in the Leadership's activities and turned into strategic and tactical plans for the Party and State.

During all prominent national (Arab) events, the plans devised by Comrade Saddam Hussein were up to the needs and circumstances of the phase, and eventually realised the desired ends. It was he who headed official delegations to most important conferences as well as heading similar delegations in important visits which laid down the basis of Iraq's Arab relations after the Revolution.

It was Comrade Saddam Hussein who devised Iraq's international relations and who has drawn attention at an earlier stage to the necessity of diversifying Iraq's international relations, and to the interest of growing power centres in the world.

It was Comrade Saddam Hussein who headed main Iraqi delegations visiting foreign countries, during which the bases of relations with these countries were established. And it was he who was the main negotiator with foreign leaders.

Comrade Saddam Hussein's role was not confined to the regional (Iraqi) domain, despite the fact that up to his assumption of the forward responsibility in the Party and Revolution in Iraq, he had not assumed an advanced position in the Party's National Command. However, his aforementioned role has been reflected in the National Command too. In its context, he was the one who takes the initiative, devises plans and makes analysis. Comrade Saddam Hussein has another great historic role: for the first time in the history of the Party he laid down the Baathist theory of action in various fields in a precise, creative and innovative manner.

Before assuming power on July 17-30, 1968, the Party has been basing its struggle and practical activity on its basics and general themes which had certainly proven its worth in their own phases.

However, the Party has been lacking a theory of action to implement in reality its own principles once it assumes power—which had been one important reason for the setback of the remarkable Party's experiment in 1963 in Iraq, and partly for the Party's setback in Syria.

Comrade Saddam Hussein has managed to crystallise the Baathist theory of action, through meticulous work; a precise and deep supervision of the development of the revolutionary process with all difficulties, complexes and ensuing new facts involved; a live contact with the Party members and the people; a creative ideological effort; and a high preparedness for dialogue and interaction with views and facts. This theory has guided the Party in the political economic, social and organisational fields as well as in its relations with the people and in its Arab and international relations in all past phases. It is today the prime source of guidance for the Party's activity in all such fields. In this, Comrade Saddam Hussein has made a valuable achievement in the history of the Party and Revolution, and even in the course of the movements of the Arab and Third World revolutions.

This prime leading role in all fields had been carried out through the position of the second man in official and protocol terms in both Party and State.

Comrade Saddam Hussein had often attributed such roles and achievements to the comrade who was occupying the forward position or to the collective leadership, thus practising self-denial so as to preserve morality and protect the course of the Revolution from perilous grounds, crises and sensitivities. For many years, nothing of his roles and achievements had surfaced except what it was not possible to hide. However, the awareness by the Party and the people of this fact has been steadily growing.

This process of leadership, which is unique in history, has been a most difficult, complex, delicate, and sensitive process. It has demanded rare qualities which have never existed together except in this distinguished leader. Had it not been for these qualities, the Party and Revolution would have faced a state of affairs which might have pushed them into perilous grounds, crises or even to catastrophes.

However, despite all difficulties and dangers—including what was directly aimed at Comrade Saddam Hussein—he, with his comrades in the Leadership has preserved the high values of morality, fulfilled promises and maintained the unity of the Party, thus enabling the Party and Revolution to move forward along their course.

As previously mentioned, all the enemies of the Party, including internal ones, were aware of these facts. So they have on many occasions tried to sow internal conflict and intrigue. However, Comrade Saddam Hussein has managed to discover and clear all this out of the path of the Party and Revolution with patience involving much pain, and with a high sense of morality characterised with self-denial for the noble values and the basic interest of the Party, Revolution and country.

These facts explain the significance of Comrade Saddam Hussein's assumption of the forward responsibility in the Party and Revolution. The past course and the essential interests of the Party, Revolution and country as a whole have underlined the importance and worth of this process which was performed within the context of full legitimacy in Party and constitutional terms, and with a high sense of morality and noble values. Comrade Saddam Hussein's leadership of the Party and the Revolution's course has been, since the beginning, a historical necessity advocated by every honest member of this Party; and with the passage of time, it has become a national necessity for all honest Iraqis who find in him the leader they have, hundreds of years been waiting for, and who they profoundly believe is leading them along the path of freedom, progress, dignity, pride and good.

Underlining such facts, particularly in this conference as the highest legal authority in the Party in Iraq and as a prominent historic occasion along its progress, does not stem from subjective motives or from the trend which was called in other experiments as the cult of personality.

Such a trend, which is rejected by Comrade Saddam Hussein himself before other comrades and which is incompatible with the traditions of the Arab nation throughout history and with the psychological nature of the Iraqi people, is totally different from the Leader-Necessity formula in terms of quality and living practice.

The Leader-Necessity is the man who at a certain stage represents the aspirations and basic interests of the Party and people. Therefore it is in the interest of the Party and the people to preserve this (Necessity) and adhere to it in a sincere and genuine manner and within the context of democratic practice, collective leadership and sound and genuine Party-related and national relations.

Rejecting such a (Necessity) or leaving its strategic line is not an individual stance or a special interpretation. Rather, it is an act aiming at inflicting direct and deliberate damage on the basic aspirations and interests of the Party and people.

Under the leadership of Comrade Saddam Hussein, the Party feels great pride and optimism, being much more unified than ever, and better able to discharge its tasks and confront dangers than any previous phase in its life. The same applies to Iraq as a whole.

Suffering, for long centuries, from foreign domination, humiliation, poverty, backwardness, injustice, corruption, Iraq has in fact been born anew. It is Iraq of freedom, dignity, strength, and hope in future.

For the first time in many centuries, Iraqi patriotism becomes the prime bond for all the children of this people, and a symbol of which the Iraqis are so proud that they are ready even for martyrdom. Equally, this deep, strong and creative Iraqi patriotism has for the first time been linked to the Arab nationalist bond constituting a living and abundant tributary of it and a steel base guarding it against the evil of enemies and covetous forces.

All of this is great achievement for the great Party, great people and great Leader Saddam Hussein.

Chapter II

THE NATIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC TASKS

The Political Report of the Party's Eighth Regional Congress has comprehensively, precisely and deeply tackled the national and democratic tasks.

It has dealt with political independence, defining in a precise manner the necessary conditions for establishing it in Iraq and the countries of the Third World. It has also dwelt upon economic independence affirming the need to achieve it as a basic ground for guarding and consolidating political independence. Further, it has referred to the issues of the National Front and democratic process in the country after the 17-30 July, 1968 Revolution. In all these vital fields, the Eighth Regional Congress has defined certain objectives and tasks for the next phase.

What is the nature of the course the Revolution had taken between the Eighth Regional Congress and the Ninth in the field of discharging the national and democratic objectives? What are the new developments in this field? What objectives and tasks were achieved among those defined by the Eighth Congress? What are those which were not achieved and why?

1 - Political Independence

The 17-30 July, 1968 Revolution has engaged in a difficult and complex battle along the path of performing the tasks of political independence. Iraq was not under colonial rule. Nor was it under any official or public foreign influence. It has no foreign bases either. Yes, national independence was fragile and vulnerable to dangers. Before the Revolution, espionage rings had so cancerously spread over the country that it had become an open place for the activities of Zionist, colonialist and Iranian intelligence services as well as of those of a number of other foreign countries. Iraq was also acutely lacking in the essential requirements for the protection of its political independence, such as strong central government, economic independence, balanced international relations and other factors which guard independence and make it a living and strong reality.

As the Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress inferred, the Party managed to clear away all the conditions which had been posing a threat to political independence in the country, thanks to its comprehensive national view and firm revolutionary will. The espionage rings were liquidated. No longer does this issue poses a political threat. Rather, it has become a normal technical issue which competent organs can handle. A strong central government was established. In 1974, the Revolution launched a decisive battle against the forces of reactionary insurgency in the north of the country, totally defeating them. And in March 1975, the central government's control was comprehensively forced, for the first time since 1961, on that part of the country.

The past phase witnessed certain progress in the national awareness and the experience of the competent organs in guarding the basic structure of the state and its secrets against attempts at infiltration and penetration. Intensive stress was laid on spreading the national and socialist culture and making it the prevailing culture in the country whether in education or information or culture. Despite the fact that good progress was made in this respect, the Party still has to continue this course with yet more interest and vigor with a view to making the national and socialist culture and prevailing aspect in all fields, so as to bring man up in a nationalist and socialist manner and protect him from all harmful effects of foreign cultures. The Party has, however, to constantly maintain its stance of creative interaction with useful foreign cultures and experiments.

In the past phase, the Party's experience had been enriched through the battle of national independence. The Party had discovered that this question is not confined to political independence which was decisively achieved, but rather is closely linked to the preservation of the free national will and the maintenance of all its political, economic, military and other requirements, especially in shouldering the great and complex national tasks on local and Arab levels. The most prominent of these requirements are:

First: Establishing balanced international relations with various forces in the world, which are closely linked to the national interests on local and Arab levels. Failure to perform this task brings the country concerned, in result rather than in intentions, into the orbit of one of the big powers or into that of a group of states. In his address to Iraqi Ambassadors in 1975, published in «Iraq and International Relations», Comrade Saddam Hussein confirmed this point and outlined sound solutions for it. He stressed the need to diversify Iraq's foreign relations, especially with the power centers of the world and with those growing ones so as to enhance the free national will on one hand, and provide better chances for meeting national needs at both local and Arab levels on the other.

Second: The diversification of armament sources. This important aspect in enhancing political independence and free national will for all states is of great importance and sensitivity for Iraq, given its special conditions and the nature of its national tasks.

For many years before the Revolution, Iraq's arms supplies had been coming from one source, the Soviet Union. In general, the Soviet Union has cooperated well with Iraq in this regard. The Revolution has succeeded in building up strong armed forces with good equipment and the most modern arms.

However, out of its profound view of national independence, the Revolution has discovered through experience that reliance on one source for armaments puts shackles on national will, especially when the country has to engage in great military battles for

national reasons. In such a case, military requirements can be satisfied only to a certain extent from the source of its armament.

Proceeding from its strategic appraisal, the Leadership was determined to follow a planned and constant policy to diversify the sources of armament. Hence, it has developed military relations with other socialist countries and with Yugoslavia. It has established extensive relations with France in the field of military supplies of arms and equipment. The Revolution has also established armament relations with other countries in Europe and in other areas.

This policy has paid off remarkably well during the battle with the Iranian enemy. After we were forced to decisively and comprehensively confront the Iranian enemy, the Soviet Union has totally stopped all military supplies to Iraq. However, it has been possible to meet the needs of the battle in a remarkable and comprehensive manner, thanks to the Leadership's proper policy of constantly maintaining a large reserve of military equipment, diversifying the armament sources and adopting new and daring formulas in satisfying our military needs.

Despite this break in supplies, which had lasted for a considerable time, the Iraqi armed forces have remained very powerful, with most of its needs met. In fact, its armament conditions have even improved on those of pre-war times in certain fields.

The policy of diversifying the sources of armament constitutes today one central component of the Revolution's policy in enhancing political independence and consolidating free national will.

Third: The building-up of military industry - which is related to the second factor above. To build up such an industry is a necessary prerequisite for consolidating national independence and free national will. If it is not possible to manufacture all that our armed forces need, it is quite possible, even necessary, to provide as much as possible of such needs through national industry.

Emphasis was given to certain parts of this industrialization process, given the fact that certain arms are subject to monopoly. This was done within certain calculations.

The Revolution has laid considerable stress on this issue. Good progress has been made; and the conditions of the battle against the Iranian enemy have been great incentives for such progress.

Fourth: Another question closely and sensitively related to national independence, is that of the Iranians living in Iraq, some of whom have acquired Iraqi nationality.

Many factors have led to the illegal growth of a large Iranian community in Iraq. Among these are Iraq's well-known historical conditions, its nearness to Iran, the Persian occupation of Iraq in the dark ages following the fall of the Abbasid Empire, the presence of holy shrines in Iraq, and the lack of a strong central government during the Ottoman era. Others are the weakness of the Iraqi government established after 1920 and its lack of clear laws and rules defining citizenship and foreigners' residence; the odd conditions following the July 1958 Revolution and the control by many Shu'ubite (Anti-Arab) elements of certain sensitive State organs; and the fragile aspect and corruption of the government during the Arif regime.

A considerable number of the members of this community acquired Iraqi nationality with legal and legitimate means sometimes and with illegal and illegitimate means most of the time.

The Iraqi people are known for its tolerance. Besides its decisive Arab and Islamic character, Iraq throughout its history, has embraced many ethnic and religious minorities which lived in peace and fraternity so long as the country was under normal conditions and with Iraqi and Arab sovereignty.

These principles and practices were firmly established after the assumption of power by the Arab Baath Socialist Party on 17-30 July 1968. As a nationalist and human Party, it has rejected ever since its founding all forms and practices of Shu'ubism (anti-Arabism) and racism.

It believes in fraternal relations among ethnic and religious communities living in the Arab lands, and in the principles of fraternal relations among nations and peoples of the world.

However, the bitter fact confirmed through long historical experience is that the majority of Iranians who settled in Iraq and enjoyed for decades or even centuries its riches and its people's brotherly treatment - some of them were treated as full citizens with all rights

and privileges after they had acquired Ira-qui nationality - have harbored spiteful racist feelings against Iraq and the Arab nation. They had not shown any loyalty to the soil on which they had lived or to the homeland whose nationality they had acquired. Rather, they retained their loyalty to and connections with Iran, serving its conspiratorial and expansionist plans against Iraq and the Arab nation, regardless of the nature of the regime in Iran.

It is quite a mistake to think that this aspect has arisen after the assumption of power in Iran by Khomeini. It had been there during the Qadjari era when Iraq was under Ottoman control, and had continued during the regime of Riza Pahlavi and his son Mohammed after Iraq had achieved its superficial independence during the Royal regime. It had also continued during the regimes of Qassim and Arif.

The same aspect has continued after the July 17-30 Revolution. When, in April 1969, the Shah renounced the 1937 agreement - thus posing a threat to the sovereignty of Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab - conspired against Iraq's revolutionary government, and extended aid to Barzani's gang, the Iranians resident in Iraq, some of them with Iraqi nationality, had worked as a fifth column inside Iraqi society. Indeed, they were the cause of the most disruptive campaigns of rumors in this society. It was they who were providing Iranian intelligence, and through that the imperialist and Zionist intelligence, with information on Iraq's economy and strategic positions, its armed forces' conditions, and all other information needed by Iranian intelligence and its intelligence allies.

Some members of this community had taken part in the Shah-sponsored reactionary conspiracy of 1970 which was referred to in the Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress. After the Revolution, they were allies of Barazani's clique inside Iraq.

When the dispute with the Shah of Iran grew more acute, this fifth column tried to confront the Revolution openly and escalated its conspiratorial activity. As a punitive measure, the Revolution deported a few thousands of Iranian residents in Iraq to Iran with a view to ridding the country of their evil and conspiracies.

This measure applied towards the end of 1971 and afterwards, was also a punishment for those who had committed treason against the land which has given them shelter for many centuries.

Moreover, this step was a form of relative deterrence for those elements. The remainder of the Iranian community and those loyal to Iran, among the ones with Iraqi nationality

gave in to the fait accompli after they realized that the Revolution was determined to use its iron fist against them, and that all their attempts to undermine that decision - which many parties, including the Communist Party, had tried to obstruct or invalidate - had failed; and when the Revolution successfully resisted the campaigns of distortion staged by the Shah's regime and its friends in the region and abroad against this measure.

After Khomeini's regime had assumed power in Iran and revealed its evil intentions against Iraq and after its plan to invade Iraq and impose Persian hegemony over it had become clear, this question had surfaced again in a more serious manner than ever.

The Iranian residents in Iraq - some of whom had Iraqi nationality - who were loyal to the Shah's regime and were serving its plans, had at once shifted their loyalty to Khomeini and his regime, not because they were necessarily in agreement with its ideology or policy, but rather because of their racist hatred of Iraq and the Arab nation.

Indeed, those have again formed a fifth column which was very active in serving Khomeini's regime and in staging internal subversion, thus becoming the largest medium where the puppet Da'wa Party has grown, and where its members have taken refuge and got financial aid and facilities for their subversive and murderous acts. Some Iranians who had recently acquired Iraqi nationality had even directly taken part in murders and explosions carried out against the public, Party members and State organizations.

Hence, it was necessary to take a decisive attitude towards the question of an Iranian presence in Iraq, which, in that phase, and more than ever before, had become very sensitive and closely connected with national independence and security and with the basic interests of the people and the country. Thus, the Revolution's bodies took action to deport those elements from the homeland, as well as punitive measures against them because of their conspiratorial and treacherous attitude towards Iraq.

This correct national stance soon paid off. Within a few weeks, ill-intentioned rumors and aspects of confusion which they had spread against Iraq, to the advantage of the Iranian regime, sharply dwindled.

The Iranian radio and intelligence services were no longer able to have such sources of information as they had formerly. The psychological conditions in many Iraqi areas of whose population those had made an important part were no longer upset. Market conditions had become normal and the monopoly and lack of goods and price fluctuations diminished, because of the departure of those Iranian residents who had long occupied an important place in the commercial bourgeois in Iraq, controlling essential links in its trade.

This measure has, in fact saved Iraq from a serious cancer. In removing this cancer, the Revolution further enhanced the national independence and will. It was no longer possible thereafter to exploit the presence of Iranians in Iraq to the advantage of the Iranian regime's conspiratorial and expansionist plans which, regardless of their covers are connected with the Zionist and colonialist plans which are aimed at undermining Arab nationalism and the independent Arab policy, fragmenting the Arab nation and imposing hegemony over its land and will. It has become clear to all, that it is no longer possible to use this or any other similar issue against Iraq and its sovereignty and unity.

The Revolution led by the Party profoundly adheres to human principles in which it believes. The treacherous stance of the Iranian community in Iraq and of some of its members with Iraqi nationality has not and will not change this policy.

All Iraqis, including those of foreign origins, have their chances to be true Iraqi citizens with all rights and duties of citizenship in accordance with the laws in force. They will be always the object of love and care by Iraq and its revolutionary government so long as they adhere to their Iraqi identity and remain sincerely committed to their homeland, Iraq.

However, it should be clear that anyone of non-Iraqi origin will be dealt with in exactly the same manner as were those treacherous Iranians if he stands against the homeland, which has given him nationality and care.

The Revolution will never allow the return of the phenomenon of resident Iranians in Iraq and the methods they used to stab the Iraqi homeland and people in the back.

The Iraqi homeland is for all Iraqis and the Iraqi people is one solid and coherent body absolutely and permanently attached to Iraq.

The Iraqi nationality is the official identity of Iraqi citizenship. It is an identity of honor and a pledge of service to Iraq, loyalty to its soil, full and absolute assimilation in its history, destiny and national aspirations. It is not a cover or a means to undermine these principles and values.

2 - Economic Independence

The experiment made by the 17-30 July, 1968 Revolution led by the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party in the field of economic independence is a model and pioneering experiment in the Third World.

The Party was aware of all aspects of economic independence. These complex and delicate aspects were tackled in the Eighth Regional Congress report and many other Party documents and talks by Comrade Saddam Hussein. All the dangers besetting

economic independence were clearly defined as well as the way to confront them with a view to enhancing independence and making it an established fact.

In this respect, oil nationalization was the decisive battle between the Revolution and the colonialist and monopolistic forces. With its decisive and comprehensive success, the Revolution has taken Iraq from the age of economic subservience to colonialist and monopolistic powers and of being directly exposed to their negative influence, to the age of economic independence which has become, as we have said, a real and concrete fact, thanks to the policies of the Party and Revolution before and after the nationalization battle.

Upon the meeting of the Eighth Regional Congress, the Revolution had achieved 85 per cent of the process of oil nationalization. The shares of Britain and France in the Basra Petroleum Company were not yet nationalized. In accordance with the Eighth Regional Congress's call for consolidating «full sovereignty over our prime national wealth, oil, in all aspects* it was decided on December 8, 1975 to nationalize the shares of these two states. Earlier, the share of Holland was nationalized on October 10, 1973; and the share of Portugal on December 20, 1973. Thus, all Iraqi oil, together with all its branches and activities, has become fully nationalized.

In accordance with the instructions of the Eighth Regional Congress, the government has achieved the construction of projects of strategic nature such as the strategic pipeline, Al-Bakr off-shore terminal, the trans-Turkey oil pipeline and other great projects which contribute to consolidating our economic independence and ensures a great freedom for Iraq to deal with its oil wealth away from attempts at blackmail and exploitation, whether by the Syrian regime, or other countries in the region, or colonialist and monopolistic powers. Upon Comrade Saddam Hussein's direct instructions, attention was drawn at an earlier stage to the necessity of diversifying Iraq's production of oil and energy so as to avoid any blockade that may be imposed by international powers against us, whether in terms of quantity of exports or pricing. Iraq has been also distinguished as the biggest national marketing body in the Third World.

Iraq's oil policy whether in its direct dealings with states or through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) has been a model of real national policy which gives first priority to national interests while well understanding the requirements of international cooperation on sound and balanced bases.

In recent years, despite attempts by colonialist powers and certain hostile states in the region, Iraq's responsible role in international oil policy has been greatly enhanced.

As for foreign trade and its relation with the issues of economic independence which were tackled by the Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress, the Revolution has adopted a balanced policy. It has established trade relations with friendly states and with other ones with which our dealings are advantageous. Our commercial relations were linked to the stance of these states towards our national cause and towards the question of oil marketing. Hence, Iraq has warded off any attempt at linking its economy with any foreign bloc or axis. Indeed, Iraq acts freely in the commercial field, thus maintaining its full economic independence.

Iraq has adopted the same principles in implementing the comprehensive development plan. To implement a comprehensive and ambitious development plan requires help from foreign companies, firms and expertise. Need also has arisen for foreign workforce. The Leadership of Party and Revolution has earnestly sought to diversify dealings with other states in this field in order that the development plan should not be tied to any particular foreign party as this would put shackles on our free national will and independence. However, particular attention was paid to the quality of projects implementation, the speed of implementation which is very important, and prices.

The Leadership has always given opportunities to foreign companies, firms and states within a political perspective, pertaining to the protection of the national independence and will from any form of irresponsible action of influence, and to relating these opportunities to the stance of the relevant states towards our national causes on the local as well as the Arab levels.

This policy has paid off remarkably well during the war against the Iranian enemy. Iraq's full economic independence, its flexibility and freedom in making economic dealings with all countries of the world and its sound policy of maintaining reserves for emergencies have been a basic factor in the success of our battle with the Iranian enemy. Further, these aspects have gained the Iraqi experiment the appreciation of the whole world. Despite the conditions of war, the Iraqi economy remained fully independent and prosperous; and the development plan in its main parts has proceeded as planned by the Leadership.

The course of consolidating economic independence should continue in the same spirit and with the same methods used by the Revolution during the past phase. The country's continuing progress in all fields, the successful implementation of the development plan and the increase and development of national industrial and agricultural production—all these factors enhance economic and political independence and consolidate Iraq's role in nationalist issues and in international community.

3 - The Kurdish Question

When the Eighth Regional Congress was held, the colonialist and reactionary insurgency staged by Mustafa Barazani's gang had not yet started. However, there were clear indications that this gang was determined to conspire against the Revolution and national unity and to trigger off an insurgency. The Eighth Regional Congress has remarkably tackled the Kurdish question in principled and political terms, defining precisely the stance of the Party and Revolution towards this question, which occupies a very high place among national causes tackled by the Revolution in a highly principled manner and with a high degree of precision.

The Congress confirmed that the commitment of the Party and Revolution to the Declaration of March 11, 1970 and to implementing all its articles, is a constant political and principled commitment on which there is no going back, whatever the conditions may be.

It has also confirmed that this did not mean any commitment towards the leadership of the Kurdish Democratic Party (Barazani group) pointing out that the range of cooperation with this leadership would be defined in the light of its attitude towards the Party and Revolution and the March 11 Declaration as well as in the light of its fulfillment of its commitments as defined by the Declaration and its clear adherence to the national policy and unity.

The Congress has also confirmed that commitment to the March Declaration and the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish question "must not lead us to underrate suspect activities, encouraged by imperialists by way of puppet and reactionary groups in the Kurdish area, with the aim of disrupting national unity, destabilizing the Autonomy Region and perpetuating secession in defiance of the country's progressive and democratic evolution."¹

In two months after the end of the Eighth Regional Congress meetings, and on the very date for the implementation of autonomy in accordance with the 1970 March Declaration, the Revolution Command Council announced on March 11, 1974 the Autonomy Law for Kurdistan region.

This law paved the way for establishing the autonomy bodies, the Executive and Legislative Councils, which ensure the exercise by the Kurdish people of its legitimate rights within the national unity.

However, Mullah Mustafa Barazani's group refused to cooperate with the Revolution leadership and took hostile attitudes towards the national unity and the Revolution. It had also launched an open insurgency on a very large scale. To stage an insurgency against the Revolution was not a stance solely related to Barazani's group, but also an essential part of the Zionist, imperialist and reactionary conspiracy against the Revolution. Zionism and American imperialism had encouraged Mustafa Barazani to launch an insurgency and asked the Shah of Iran to support him on a large-scale so as to stab and weaken the Revolution. This was viewed as a step towards overthrowing or subjecting it to the American imperialist plan which the United States had embarked on implementing on a large-scale in the region especially after the October 1973 war and the beginning of the course of capitulationism settlement which later reached the Camp David stage.

The battle against the reactionary insurgency and the Zionist, imperialist and reactionary forces which stood behind it, was so valiant that it will be proudly recorded in the history of national struggle. Many of its facts were not publicized or known on the local, national (Arab) and international levels. The Revolution had then chosen not to largely publicize its handling of the battle because it was an extremely delicate and sensitive matter as an internal issue on the face of it.

The Revolution was trying every possible means to reduce the volume of intervention in this issue by imperialist forces and hostile elements inside the country as well as hostile forces in the region.

The decisive success made by the Revolution in this valiant battle which lasted for a whole year was based on solid and correct bases.

The first aspect of the Revolution's approach to the battle against the insurgency was to strike a balance with precision and awareness between the need to struggle through all legitimate means against the insurgency and the full principled commitment to the Autonomy Law and the legitimate rights of our Kurdish people exactly as the Eighth Regional Congress had defined it.

In this respect Comrade Saddam Hussein said:

"Before to March 11, 1970, we had stated that if the Kurdish question was dealt with through a purely military approach, we would be the losers, even if the last trench of the enemy forces in the mountains had been defeated. But if the question was approached in a correctly principled and political manner, we would win the battle even if our enemies were numerous. This prediction has been justified in the defeat of a renegade faction which involved more than a purely military solution. The Iraqi army, despite its valiant role, would not have been able to perform effectively if it had not been defending the political principles and aims drawn up by the political leadership. Principles were

responsible for the defeat of Mullah Mustafa Barazani and his renegade faction. The essence of these principles is that the problems of all our people, be they in Kurdistan, in Basra, or simply our own, should be dealt with in exactly the same spirit"².

The second aspect of the Revolution's approach to fighting the insurgency lay in the Revolution's concern to distinguish, in principled and practical terms, between the Kurdish citizens and the insurgents. In such complex conditions as those of the insurgency it was quite possible to expect some sort of entanglement between the reactionary forces of insurgency and the Kurdish people who were liable to be influenced by the reactionary insurgents' distortions or whose places of residence fell within the area of the insurgents' activity. Dealing with these Kurdish citizens as part of the Iraqi people and the Revolution's followers, the Revolution had sought, by every possible means, to win them over to its fold.

"In the discussions of the Higher Committee for North Affairs attended by some leading comrades, during which, a review of the combat operations took place, we asked: "Where does our greatest victory up to the present lie?" Some said that the greatest victory was the crossing of the Ali Beg Pass 3, in accordance with the well-known plan. But we disagreed. The greatest victory was that, up to the present, no soldier had fired at any individual in the opposite trench when the latter had exhausted his ammunition and raised his hands in surrender. The greatest victory was that no single woman had been raped during the fighting. There was no repetition of past plunders. Despite the bloodshed, the surrendering insurgents were invited to eat at the same dish with the soldiers, as if nothing had happened. This is the real victory. The unity of Iraq is still strong in the hearts of the Kurds fighting in the opposite trenches, as well as in the hearts of the Kurds and Arabs fighting in the armed forces. So long as the mentality and psychology of unity prevail, this is the greatest victory."⁴

The battle has seen remarkable aspects of national relations between the Armed Forces fighters and the Party members on one hand and the Kurdish people on the other. The Kurdish citizens were abandoning the insurgency and joining the Revolution. The same aspect characterized relations with the population of the areas liberated by the Revolution's forces from the despotic control of the reactionary insurgency and its evil practices.

This principled national stance has created a good psychological atmosphere to heal the bleeding wounds caused by the large-scale and lengthy insurgency as well as by the abnormal conditions previously prevailing in the region.

The Kurdish people have felt through actual experience and the most delicate and difficult conditions that Iraq's Leadership is a truly a national one which deal with all citizens on the basis of equality and affection. They have also felt the difference between the national and principled characteristics and the morality of the Party on one hand, and the hireling nature of the insurgency leadership, its lack of morality and its despotic and evil practices on the other.

The battle against the insurgency of Mustafa Barazani's group was not merely a successful military campaign but rather a comprehensive, political, military, psychological and economic campaign with local aspects as well as those related to the conditions in the region and the stance of its various states.

It has also its international aspects. Therefore the strategy of the battle, its conduct and its daily tactics were a decisive factor in deciding its success.

Comrade Saddam Hussein himself as Chairman of the Highest Committee for North Affairs has laid down the strategy of fighting the insurgency and defined its daily tactics on the military, political, economic, psychological and social levels. He prepared a comprehensive report incorporating all aspects of this strategy. The report was approved by the Party's Regional Command as a basic guide in this respect.

The first essential aspect of this strategy was not to put off the date of autonomy implementation. Barazani's group had earlier proposed to extend the duration of March 1970 Declaration to five years on the pretext that there was a need for completing the dialogue, which meant a postponement of the implementation of the autonomy to March 1975.

The Communist Party supported this proposal which was also welcomed by many circles. However, the Leadership, in view of Comrade Saddam Hussein's report, has rejected this proposal and confirmed the need that the Revolution should fulfill its promise by putting autonomy into effect on its very date, March 11, 1974. Hence, it has foiled a plan aimed at maintaining the state of confusion and chaos in the northern part of the country as well as linking the insurgency with the attempts which were under way at the time to destabilize the whole region. In a year after this insurgency, the situation in Lebanon exploded. But then the Revolution had already defeated the insurgency thus averting any possibility of linking it to the conspiracies aimed at the region and to their previously made timings.

The second essential aspect of the strategy adopted by the Leadership -through the Highest Committee - was to avoid traditional methods in confronting the insurgency on all levels, and particularly the military one.

The leadership of the insurgency had a long experience of facing the Iraqi Armed Forces. One mistaken consideration held by this leadership was that it could wage a lengthy war against conventional armed forces which use conventional military methods. Through such a means, it thought that it could realize the aim of insurgency, namely to create a state of attrition connected with the conspiracy to overthrow the Revolution or to subject it to colonialist and foreign plans and influences.

The Leadership was aware of this fact. Hence, under direct, sometimes indirect instructions from Comrade Saddam Hussein new plans were devised from which the main lines of successful military operations were derived. New methods of combat were applied - which surprised the insurgents, confused their plans and inflicted heavy losses on them.

A great effort was made in this regard, for it was not easy to change fighting methods in the army after long years of application. The young Ba'athist officers have made a prominent contribution to the battle against the insurgency. They have also gained excellent experience in combat and command, especially considering that they faced, in this battle, the most modern American weapons which were pouring in to the insurgents through the Shah's regime.

The Iraqi Armed Forces have valiantly and efficiently fought, proving once again that they are worthy of shouldering the responsibility of defending the sovereignty and unity of the homeland. These battles have enriched these forces' expertise and efficiency despite the fact that they had delayed their training programs which were set for turning the Iraqi army into a big and modern army.

It was a difficult and hard battle in which the Armed forces sustained a number of casualties that exceeded 16,000, martyred and wounded, while the total figure of casualties among military men and civilians was about 60,000, martyred, killed and wounded.

The Iraqi people has paid a costly price in its own sons' blood to uproot a serious schism aimed at weakening and tearing Iraq apart as well as obstructing its forward move towards full freedom, power and progress. Surfacing in the following years was the great difference between the conditions to wind) certain forces sought to drag Iraq through the insurgency and the conditions to which the Revolution led by the Party had brought Iraq. The unified, powerful and prosperous Iraq which is playing a prominent role on the Arab and international levels is the outcome of the great successes achieved by the Revolution, in the forefront of which is that decisive battle against the reactionary insurgency backed by Zionism, imperialism .and reactionary forces.

By defeating the reactionary insurgency, the Revolution managed to implement the ingredients of democratic settlement of the Kurdish question. The Autonomy bodies were founded and firmly established; stability and security in the north prevailed; and the development process covered all the parts, the region after long years during which it had lagged behind in this field in comparison with other areas in Iraq.

The Revolution had allocated large funds for the reconstruction and development of the Autonomy Region. Industries were introduced, roads were paved, schools and hospitals were built, tourist facilities were developed in recent years, and the Party's relation with the Kurdish people was cemented. Hence, defeat was the lot of all attempts made by the reactionary renegade group and the Communist Party to isolate these people from the Arab Baath Socialist Party on the pretext that it is a nationalist Arab Party which cannot represent the interests of the Kurdish people and express their aspirations. These people have felt in a lively way and through deep experience and critical circumstances that the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party is the vanguard national party round which they should rally so as to maintain their interests and realize their legitimate aspirations. Hence, the Party's organization has spread on a large scale among the Kurdish people.

The Party's Eleventh National Congress has endorsed an extremely important document defining the Party's attitude towards ethnic groups and minorities in the Arab homeland. This document, published on April 19, 1979 asserted that "The Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party is the vanguard Party which represents all the people living in the Arab homeland, irrespective of their national languages and characteristics. It is the sincere, fighting and firm defender of their cause, as well as being their leader along the path of freedom and unified society in the Arab homeland."

We can confirm that the task of the comprehensive and firmly-established national unity has been achieved and that the democratic national settlement of the Kurdish question has been realized.

However this historic achievement is still exposed to conspiracy. The imperialist forces, the Zionist entity, the Syrian and Libyan regimes, certain forces attached to the Socialist camp, the Iranian regime - all are working, together or separately, to support certain hireling and treacherous forces with a view to destabilizing the northern area. The activities of these forces have escalated under the conditions of the war with the Iranian enemy.

In this respect, the Syrian regime has a special role. This dubious and spiteful regime which is involved in sectarian and divisive plans in the (Middle East) region has been playing the card of insurgency in the northern part of Iraq since the beginning. Despite its criticism of the Party and Revolution for issuing the Declaration of March 1970 on the pretext that it involved negligence of Iraq's Arabism, this regime had established relations of cooperation with the Barazani's clique; and its secret service had been supplying this clique with weapons especially during the insurgency between March 1974 and March 1975. After the defeat of the insurgency, the Syrian regime's secret service gave the insurgents full backing, and it is still cooperating with them in full coordination with the Communists, the Al-Da'wa Party bandit and the Iranian regime.

Motivated by its spite against the Party and Revolution and proceeding from its dubious activities, the Libyan regime has also established relations with the puppet and dubious elements who seek to revive insurgency in the north of the country. It has also extended aid and support to these and other hireling elements which are conspiring against the Party and Revolution and against the national unity of Iraq.

However, all such attempts are but desperate ones which cannot shake the power of the Party and Revolution. Indeed, all attempts at destabilizing the northern area are nothing but technical attempts isolated from the Kurdish people who denounce and violently resist them and rally in a large-scale and profound way round the Party, the Revolution and the Leader (President Saddam Hussein). We are fully confident of the possibility of uprooting these abnormal phenomena and conditions and of moving forward along the path initiated by the Revolution, that of national unity, national fraternity, and the building up of the foundations of peace, stability and progress.

4 - The National Progressive Front

The Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress has tackled the issue of the Progressive Front in historical terms. It explained the historical conditions of this question before the Revolution and the progress of relations after the Revolution between

the Party and other parties until the establishment of the Front in July 1973, the declaration of its charter and the formation of its bodies in August 1973.

The Party has regarded the formation of the Front as an important national achievement and a prominent step along the path of unifying the forces of the people with a view to fulfilling the national tasks in a profound and comprehensive manner. Moreover, the Party has considered the Front a model that can radiate its positive influence on the movement of Arab revolution which has long suffered from fragmentation and contradiction.

In the following years, the Party had exerted great ideological and political efforts to bring this experiment to success. Since the beginning, the Party has viewed the Front as a force to be added to its own and to that of the Revolution with a view to performing the national tasks. It has also viewed the Front as an open area for interaction of views within the context of unquestionable commitment to the leading role of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party. The Party has openly and clearly asserted that it has alone the right in historical and realistic terms, to leading the revolutionary course in the country because it was the Party which launched the Revolution, made its basic achievements and has the widest popular base. The Party has also stressed the need that the parties joining the Front should recognize and deal with this fact in an objective and honest manner.

However, the leadership of the Iraqi Communist Party which has agreed to join the Front on the basis of certain rules which were made clear during the open discussions and declared stances, and were confirmed by the Charter issued by the Front had not sincerely and objectively adhered to these rules.

The Iraqi Communist Party has been characterized by the following basic intermingled aspects which have their own inter-related results:

1 - Despite all changes in the world communist movement and the movement of world revolution, the Communist Party in Iraq has remained throughout all its history lacking the subjective will. It has never had any independent policy, or stances or initiatives whatever limited they may be.

2 - Because of this aspect as well as of the backwardness of the Communist Party's leading bodies, this Party has no original or creative contribution to realizing and

analyzing the basic facts and phenomena characterizing Iraq in particular and the Arab homeland as a whole. All the Communist Party's analyses of the conditions in Iraq and the Arab homeland and of all local and national issues and problems were therefore a literal translation of the Soviet stances and a poor transcription of traditional Marxist literature despite all essential differences in time and conditions.

This particular aspect has made the Communist Party totally incapable of understanding the nature of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and its historical role in the movement of Arab revolution and in Iraq in particular, as well as the significance of the revolutionary progress led by the Party in the country. Every advance made by the Party along the path of revolutionizing the society and performing the national and democratic tasks was causing the Communist Party further confusion and perplexity in analysis and assessment.

Instead of making a genuine and open ideological effort to understand and interact with the actual reality in the country in a sincere and objective manner, the leadership of the Communist Party dealt with this reality in quite a different and un-objective manner. Its attitude was one of envy and complex feeling against the Party. Indeed, it had been betting on certain imaginary conditions and developments inside the Party. This had made it commit more mistakes in dealing with the Party and Revolution, and complicated its relations with them.

It is only natural that the Ba'ath Party, as any other revolutionary Party passing through a process of evolution and ideological, political and organizational maturity as well as through a unique and complex experience in building up a revolutionary government, should suffer from certain internal difficulties and even from malicious internal conspiracies, the last of which was the conspiracy of a treacherous group of leadership members who were discovered in July 1979.

There have been many difficulties, complexes and gaps in the constitutional conditions preceding Comrade Saddam Hussein's assumption of the forward official responsibility in the Party and Revolution, where the question of leadership had not been clearly settled. The leadership of the Communist Party had imagined that it could take advantage of such conditions and make a bet on imaginary likely developments. However, despite all complex internal conditions, the malicious conspiracies of the treacherous group of some leadership members and the difficulties of the previous constitutional formula, the Party remained powerful enough to face those tricks and conspiracies. No one has ever managed to change the basic course of the Revolution which is based on the Party's ideology and basic tendencies.

5 - The attitude of the Communist Party in Iraq towards

Arab nationalism, Arab unity and Palestinian cause were characterized by negative-ness because of the two aforementioned factors as well as of the historical background of the Communist Party in Iraq. Since the beginning, this party has laid certain stress on working among the ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq in accordance with certain divisive calculations. It has therefore been influenced by the negative atmosphere which had been prevailing among these minorities in the past eras.

Although some aspects of this attitude are related to how the leadership of the Communist Party understands the national question from the Marxist internationalist point of view, it used to go too far in its negative stance because of its historical background. Therefore, it is quite right to apply Shu'ubism (anti-Arab divisive trend) to this leadership.

As for its attitude towards the Palestinian cause, it has always been far away from, and sometimes in conflict with, the nationalist stance. It has even had certain extremely bad attitudes.

This had led to complicating relations between the Party and this leadership which had not made any sincere and profound effort to develop its attitude towards nationalist causes and the Palestinian cause in particular - which is incompatible with the concepts and main aspects of the Charter of the Front in this respect. For the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party, the Arab unity and Palestine causes are not merely political questions. Rather, they are two central issues in its ideology, strategy and daily political, cultural and information struggle. Hence, the contradiction and disagreement between the Party and the leadership of the Communist Party in political stances and in the relevant practices after the formation of the Front had always caused problems and complicated relations not only on the level of leadership but also on that of the rank and file of both parties as well as on the international level.

The Communist Party, for instance, used to defy the feelings of the people and the Party by establishing relations in public with the Israeli Communist Party. It also used to publish cables sent to it from that party in its public papers in Iraq.

The formula of the Progressive Front had been more advanced and open than similar ones in other countries of the region. The Communist Party had enjoyed full freedom in political and organizational activity and in foreign relations, and its newspapers were independent and not subject to any form of censorship. However, the leadership of the Communist Party had not viewed such a formula as an outcome of the sound democratic

attitude of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party towards the Front and its true desire to build up a distinguished democratic Front experiment. Rather, it had exploited the Front in an opportunistic manner contradictory to the Front's concepts and relations.

The Communist Party's activity among the people and the trends of its newspapers had not shown any interest in defending the revolutionary government and protecting the great revolutionary gains which it had achieved. Rarely had the Communist Party viewed the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and the July 17-30 Revolution and its achievements and leadership in positive terms corresponding to the objective reality. Rather, the Communist Party's activity and its newspapers' trends were focusing on negative aspects and mistakes which are a normal phenomenon in a great revolutionary process. In so doing, they were not aiming at treating these aspects, but at making dishonest gains at the expense of the Party and Revolution.

For many years, the Party leadership had been warning the leadership of the Communist Party of this approach which is contradictory to the Front concepts and the mutual commitments within the Front. It is quite illogical that the Communist Party is a participant in the Front and the Cabinet, enjoying all rights and privileges of any legal party participating in the Front and Cabinet, while at the same time it deals with the Government as if it is an opposition party fishing for negative aspects and mistakes.

The Party was eager to warn the Communist Party of these practices in a manner consistent with principles and morality, with a view to preserving Front relations and traditions and bringing this experiment to success.

In a general meeting of the Front Committees in the whole country in August 1976, Comrade Saddam Hussein tackled this issue with precision, clarity and openness.

His talk, which was published in "One Trench or Two?" is a historic document insofar as the development of relations between the Party and Revolution on one hand and the Iraqi Communist Party on the other is concerned.

Comrade Saddam Hussein said: "According to our information, some brothers, especially from the Communist Party, still feel embarrassed when asked: "Are you with the Government or not? Are you with the Revolution or not?" Is it embarrassing for one to side with the great Revolution and its Government? The Revolution is cherished by every honest patriot; and its major achievements are obvious to all. If there is to be any speculation

about whether one is for or against the Revolution, it should be in the context of final results, not that of details which could be criticized in a democratic and objective manner.

We should all criticize flawed details, but errors in details should not bring us into psychological opposition with the Revolution and its Government. At the same time, however, the errors of the administration should be neither a means nor a justification for pursuing Party gains. The basic justification for these should be our ideology as we expound it and interact with the people through it.

The Communist Party believe in a line ideologically independent from that of the Ba'ath Party. The same is true of the Kurdish Democratic Party and the others. Only along such a line, should they try to make party gains, since any other way would be bound to lead to contradictions among the various national forces or even to deviation if it came into conflict with the revolutionary process. Suppose we, the Ba'athist, reversed the case and started attacking the Communists in our speeches and through our media, saying that they are attacking our system and principles. They would regard these as improper uses of the administrative apparatus and would try to make use of that to their own advantage. What do you imagine would happen? Is such a state of affairs acceptable? If it is, you can imagine how much you would lose if the leaders of the Ba'ath Party were to inform the people in their speeches of the negative aspects of the Communist Party. We say this, not out of vanity, but rather out of conviction that our relationship with the people is based on positive interaction and mutual trust. That is why they would listen to our words.

So when, instead, we speak positively of the Front, of your role in it, and of the role of the other national forces, this is very much to your advantage.

This principled and practical talk which expresses a profound desire to build up solid front relations and to proceed along the path of the Front would have been an excellent program of relations between the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and the Communist Party along the path of performing the national tasks on local and Arab levels, had the Communist Party's leadership acted with sincerity towards such relations under the Revolution with a view to discharging the tasks defined by the Charter of National Action.

However, the Communist Party's leadership acted in a contrary manner to the line defined by Comrade Saddam Hussein.

Persisting in following such a policy, the Communist Party continued its campaign of slander, distortion and subversion against the revolutionary course, through its public press and all other possible means. The Communist Party also maintained its emergency

formulas holding its central conferences secretly, which underlines its bad intentions against the Party and Revolution.

The subversive trends of the Communist Party's leadership had clearly surfaced in its attitude towards the Kurdish question. After the defeat of Barazani's clique and the presence of well-grounded objective chances for cementing the peaceful democratic settlement of the Kurdish question, enhancing security and stability in the region and consolidating national unity, the Communist Party's papers and organizations in the northern part of the country laid great stress on promoting isolationism, preaching conflict between Arab nationalism and Kurdish nationalism and reviving all chauvinistic trends among Kurds. If we go back to the Communist Party's literature at the time and strip it of its Communist posture it would not have been different from that of Barazani's clique. Such an attitude on the part of the Communist Party's leadership implied a contradiction on one hand and a negative attitude towards the Party and Revolution and towards national unity on the other.

The contradiction in the Communist Party's stance is that where it concerns Arab nationalism it is internationalist or even anti-nationalist, tending to deny Arab nationalism its own characteristics. But, where it concerns Kurdish nationalism and other ethnic minorities and particularities in Iraq, it is so nationalist that it even tends to take chauvinistic stances and stir ethnic conflicts along lines of contradiction, conflict and division. It had become quite clear that the leadership of the Communist Party which had found that the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party had decisively become the vanguard and popular force among the Arab people in Iraq had planned to become an alternative to the Barazani's leadership in the northern region. It had tried, sometimes through insinuation, sometimes through public statements to make a deal with the leadership of the Party and Revolution, where the (Arab) part of Iraq would be under the leadership of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and the (Kurdish) part of Iraq subject to the influence of the Communist Party, thus dividing Iraq.

It was, however, quite strange that the leadership of the Communist Party should forget that Barazani's leadership itself had earlier followed the same line and tried by all possible means to make such a deal with the leadership of the Party and Revolution in the difficult conditions facing the Revolution in its early years. This leadership also ignored the fact that the Leadership of the Party and Revolution had rejected such a divisive antinational policy under the most difficult and complex circumstances where the gravest threat to the Party's government was posed, asserting the motto of one Iraq, under one national leadership with one national policy. Indeed, it has launched a fierce political and military battle against this dubious divisive trend, where the greatest sacrifices were made in order to cement national unity and prevent any form of separation.

In line with such a policy, and from a chauvinistic point of view, the Communist Party started a large-scale activity among Kurds with a view to checking the spread of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party organization there as we had previously mentioned in reviewing the Kurdish question.

The Communist Party's leadership has even established relations with the new shady subversive bands which were formed inside and outside Iraq after the collapse of Barazani's clique. All this was a clear indicator that the Communist Party's leadership was aiming at withholding the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question and keeping it suspended. This was not only a mistaken or negative attitude but also one which poses a serious threat to national unity and independence. Moreover, the Communist Party's press had launched organized campaigns with no national justification whatsoever against non-Communist countries with which the Revolution was seeking to establish relations of friendship and cooperation in the national interest, on both local and Arab levels.

During official visits exchanged between officials of Iraq and those countries, the Communist Party's press was deliberately launching campaigns against those states so as to distort the aims of the Revolution's policy and to undermine relations with those countries. If, for instance, one of the Revolution's leaders visited France, the Communist party's press would deliberately launch a violent attack, unjustified in national terms, against the French Government for its policy at home or in other parts of the world.

One essential point agreed upon with the Iraqi Communist Party at the formation of the Front was the prohibition of any form of political organization and activity in the army and Armed Forces by any political party or movement except the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party. Before the inception of the Front, there had been a law promulgated on November 11, 1971 dealing in a clear-cut manner with this issue. This law had been since valid. However, the Iraqi Communist Party had done its best to outmaneuver this agreement after the formation of the Front, and continued its organizational activity inside the Armed Forces. Whenever parts of such an activity were discovered, the Communist Party leadership tried under various pretexts to save the perpetrators from punishment or to modify it.

Despite the fact that the Party and Revolution's leadership was extremely strict in implementing this law, certain complications took place in its implementation because of the Party's desire to maintain Front relations and to avoid punishing the perpetrators in cases where no bad intention was found.

However, there were many indications that the Communist Party's leadership was trying by means of such methods to tame the leadership of the Party and Revolution so that in the end it would allow as a de facto matter the Communist activity inside the armed forces.

Because of a mistake committed by one of the official bodies concerned, the implementation of death sentences on Communists who were convicted of organizational activity inside the Armed Forces was postponed for a long time. Hence, the number of those convicted rose to thirty-one.

When the Leadership realized this point, it ordered the implementation of death sentences on a group of them. The Communist Party's leadership tried to exert pressure with all means with a view to halting the implementation of death sentences on the remainder of criminals. It had made certain Communist countries' leaders send letters to the Leadership requesting non-implementation of death sentences.

Hence, the leadership of the Communist Party had revealed its entire plan and also its attempts to seek the help of certain foreign countries with whom Iraq was eager to maintain relations of friendship and cooperation. In so doing, this leadership was aiming at imposing a *fait accompli* in Iraq's internal affairs incompatible with its sovereignty and basic interests as well as with the basis of the Front.

The reply of the Party and Revolution's Leadership was clear-cut and strict. Letters were sent to those leaders of foreign states unequivocally rejecting any form of interference in Iraq's internal affairs, and asserting that the Revolution was determined to apply the law on whoever may try to break it.

The failure of all the policies and maneuvers of the Iraqi Communist Party's leadership, the diminution of the influence of the Communist Party among the people and the expansion and consolidation of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party's influence and social, progressive and democratic achievements - all have brought the Communist Party's leadership to a crossroads: either to be under the Revolution's banner and be committed to the rules of the Progressive Front and to serving the national interests on local and

Arab levels, or to move away from the Revolution and engage in a desperate venture against it. The leadership of the Communist Party opted for the second alternative.

This leadership was driven to such a deadlock by its own ideological and political backwardness, the failure of its policies and maneuvers, the diminution of its influence among the people and its total dependence. The leaders of the Iraqi Communist Party left for Moscow and other communist capitals one after another, despite the fact that no prosecution measures whatsoever were taken against them. They formed an Iraqi Communist community abroad and started to mount propaganda campaigns against the Party and Revolution in cooperation with all enemies despite their ideological and political differences.

As an expression of the desire of the Party's leadership to maintain the Front program and despite all the Communist Party's hostile attitudes to the Revolution, the national unity and the basic interests of the country, the Leadership called for a dialogue on the main issues in the relations between the two parties. This was conveyed to the Communist Party's representative in the Cabinet by Comrade Saddam Hussein himself. However, the Communist Party's leadership, whose assessments were always shortsighted and erroneous, imagined that this sincere national appeal was motivated by a certain crisis confronting the Party and Revolution. Hence, it made a condition - which can be rightly and objectively called a foolish one- that the dialogue between the two parties should be held abroad.

The Communist Party's representative in the Cabinet was thus told that those who made such conditions were obviously unwilling to go back to the Front and to the country.

Thus relations with the Communist Party's leadership had come to an end. Its representatives in the Cabinet were both relieved of their posts.

The hostile attitude of the Communist Party's leadership towards the homeland and the people was confirmed during the battle against the Iranian enemy. This leadership had ignored all national considerations which are above differences and even political conflicts of a domestic nature, when it shamefully allied itself with the Iranian enemy, the enemy of the homeland, the people and the Armed Forces, and with the enemy's local stooges. Hence it had deserved total national condemnation.

The course of the National Front which was established on the basis of sincerity to the homeland and the Revolution had not come to a halt with the Communist Party's departure from the Front. Rather, it has moved along its normal course discharging its task in embracing all sincere patriots in the context of unified action to serve the homeland and deepen the course of the Revolution.

6 - Democratic Transformations

The Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress summed up the Party and Revolution's activity in the field of democratic transformations in the past period in seeking to "lay the foundations of popular democracy and apply its formulas which are compatible with the objective conditions of the Party and Revolution."

It has also defined a central task for the next phase, namely "the completion of the requirements and bodies of popular democracy" and listed the following targets:

- 1 - To set up the National Assembly in a transitional form.

- 2 - To define the theoretical, political and legislative criteria governing people's councils and ensure the leadership of expert cadres; to give the councils the care and attention they deserve as new institutions of the revolutionary society and as one of the bases of popular democracy.

- 3 - To allow the press and unions greater scope for criticism in order to promote discussion and dialogue on fundamental questions interesting the citizens; to extend participation in such discussions, at all times and by all means, so that solutions may be found.

- 4 - Throughout the coming stage and once conditions are right, to strive to supply the remaining bases of the popular democracy, by deciding the country's permanent constitution, holding general elections to the National Assembly, and establishing representation in the people's councils on the basis of election 5.

The Report has also asserted that "the new phase demands a thorough ideological work, if the problems of establishing a popular democracy are to be solved."⁶

What then, has the Party and Revolution achieved in the field of democratic transformations in the period between the Eighth Regional Congress and this Congress?

The democratic question is one of the most complex issues in the Third World countries which have not seen a constant and steady growth during past centuries, and which have all way through suffered from colonial hegemony and monopolistic plunder.

As part of the Third World, Iraq cannot treat this issue without considering this fact. The Eighth Congress Political Report has precisely referred to a significant fact distinguishing Iraq from other Arab countries when it said: «Of all the Arab countries perhaps, Iraq was least experienced in the practice and tradition of democracy, with or without social content. From the days of the Ottoman Empire until July 1968, it had suffered one autocratic and arbitrary regime after another, with only brief intervals in which the people and progressive forces enjoyed any measure of freedom of thought, of the press, of political party and trade union activity, or could engage in parliamentary work. »

In the light of this, it would not be possible to compare the progress made by the Revolution in this field with that it made in other fields where the revolutionary will can make achievements more quickly.

In the past phase, the Revolution managed to develop the democratic practice in the revolutionary society, but it could not achieve a rapid rate of progress corresponding to the aspirations and aims defined by the Eighth Congress.

Some of the objectives laid down by this Congress were not achieved from certain reasons which we shall later tackle, while the central objective of holding general elections for the National Assembly was realized in June 1980. There were objective and subjective reasons. When the Eighth Regional Congress was held, the insurgency staged by Barazani's clique had not yet star-led. The National and Progressive Front were still young.

The most important factors which had their bearing on the rate of democratic transformations, especially in the field of establishing democratic institutions like the National Assembly, were:

- (a) the conditions in the northern region during and after the insurgency;
- (b) the relations with the Communist Party; and
- (c) the Arab conditions in the aftermath of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords.

The Party's principled stance throughout the course of the Revolution since July 17-30 has been to give every formula of popular democracy a real chance of practice and development and to reject the application of formal and superficial methods merely for pretentious reasons. For the Party, what basically matters is the people's confidence in and respect for the institutions and formulas which the Party and Revolution apply, as well as the people's belief in the originality of the Leadership's measures and decisions.

If the Party finds that a certain democratic formula is incompatible with the circumstances it will openly reject it and will not resort instead to superficial formulas through coercion or deception.

It is essential to refer here to an important question in the thinking of the Party's Leadership in the period between the Eighth Congress and the decision to hold general elections for the National Assembly. A formula for establishing a National Assembly by nomination was approved. This was confirmed in the Provisional Constitution and was listed among the objectives assigned by the Eighth Congress for the following phase in the held of democratic transformations.

However, the Leadership hesitated to implement this formula; not because it was unable to do so, for such a formula is (I u he easy to implement. Rather, the reason is in its opinion, that this formula would not be of real importance in developing democratic practice in the revolutionary society and that the people would regard it as an artificial thing with no ingredients of genuine life. Hence, the Leadership preferred not to apply it, and to wait, instead, for proper conditions to establish through elections a National Assembly with the ingredients of genuine life and the actual ability to develop democratic practice in the revolutionary society.

How were the three afore-mentioned factors affected by the process of democratic transformations?

a) The Conditions in the North of the Country

Any institutions established to develop the democratic practice in the country, namely the National Assembly has obviously to be of comprehensive national nature. Any abnormal conditions in an important part of the country would certainly have its bearing upon the conditions of the whole country.

During the insurgency, which had started within weeks after the end of the Eighth Congress, it had not been possible to hold real democratic elections in the northern part of the country. After defeating the insurgency, the Revolution had to make large-scale efforts for a long time to face the serious and complex consequences of the insurgency as well as the whole odd conditions which had long existed in the northern area.

There had been wounds, suffering, complications and misunderstanding which had to be treated with a view to creating a healthy national atmosphere in this region. The Revolution had also to make a lot of development achievements in this region in order to realize a state of parity between the benefits received by the citizens living in other parts of the country through the Revolution's, economic, social and cultural achievements on one hand, and that of the majority of citizens in this region on the other.

b) Relations with the Iraqi Communist Party

The Revolution's attitude towards establishing the desired democratic institutions cannot be affected by the attitude of this or that party towards the Revolution or the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party.

However, relations between the Party and those parties cannot but affect the pace of establishing such institutions.

When relations are normal, such institutions can be easily established if there is a conviction of the need for doing so.

As we said in the last chapter, relations with the Communist Party's leadership were unstable. With such unstable relations, it was not possible to organize democratic institutions when the roles and aims of each participant party were not known. Frankly speaking, it was not right at all to give the Communist Party leadership a new forum that it could use under the Front's cover to stage distortion campaigns against the Party and Revolution and to implement foreign strategies. Hence, the delay in establishing the National Assembly was in part caused by this factor.

c) Arab Conditions

The phase between the Eighth Congress and this Congress was characterized by a rush of so serious events in the Arab region, that the Leadership of the Party and Revolution was largely preoccupied with them at the expense of many local tasks, such as democratic transformations.

In the year following the Eighth Regional Congress the situation in Lebanon exploded, drawing much of the Leadership's attention. In 1977, Sadat made his ominous visit to Jerusalem. Since then, and for two years, the Leadership had been largely preoccupied with Arab conditions. For many months after this visit, there were intensive arguments and large-scale contacts over the best national formula for confrontation.

After the conclusion of the Camp David Accords, the Leadership called for an Arab summit conference in Baghdad. Then a Charter for National Action was concluded with the Syrian regime. The Leadership had made intensive efforts in these fields of national action. Relations with Syria after the conclusion of the Charter had taken a great part of the theoretic, practical and political activity of the Leadership.

Despite the fact that Arab conditions cannot justify the delay in building up democratic institutions, this point should be viewed realistically. When the Leadership of the Party and Revolution and all leading bodies were preoccupied with many complex nationalist (Arab) tasks, there was not enough time for carving new formulas for the democratic practice which certainly demands great theoretical, political and practical efforts.

However, the subjective or internal reasons for delaying the provision of all the requirements and institutions of popular democracy in the past phase are no less important than the objective or external reasons.

What are these subjective reasons? And how had they reflected on the course of democratic transformations in the revolutionary society?

Ever since the beginning, the Party had opted for the principles of popular democracy as an approach to democracy, that is, it has rejected the liberal approach to democracy which was brought about by capitalist experiments in Western Europe and America. It has also rejected the Communist approach known as "proletariat dictatorship."

However, the belief in popular democracy as a special approach demanded that the Party should formulate its own experiment and its own view in this field in exactly the same manner as it did in the field of socialist transformations.

On the other hand, it was not possible to expand democratic practices and formulas without corresponding favorable subjective or internal conditions in the Party and Revolution.

The Party has decisively undertaken the task of consolidating the revolutionary government and had rightly given priority to this task over any other consideration.

The phase preceding the Eighth Regional Congress had been characterized as a phase of consolidating the revolutionary government and uprooting any possibility of conspiracy or apostasy. But this task had not ended with the conclusion of that Congress. Despite the fact that the revolutionary government had then become firmly consolidated, it was still exposed to serious threats. The situation in the north of the country, the negative policies of the Communist Party which had developed into enmity and the emergence of the politico-religious phenomenon in a hostile form-all were posing a considerable challenge to the Party and Revolution.

The Eighth Congress Political Report has stressed the need to restore the balance between centralism and democracy in action whether in the Party, in the government, or in the unions, as well as in society as a whole, by employing gradual and firm methods. At the same time, the Report said that the emergency methods, which we have to drop in all fields insofar as the circumstances permit, may sometimes be greatly needed to deal with a new situation.

In the light of this assessment and the objective conditions of the Party, and because of certain conditions inside the Party, including the past constitutional formula, the Leadership had not been enthusiastic about striking a balance corresponding with the circumstances between centralism and democracy, with a view to expanding and developing democratic practice and establishing relevant institutions. Rather, there has been certain apprehension that any expansion in democratic institutions may be exploited to inflict harm on, and eventually weaken the Party and Revolution.

During this stage, Comrade Saddam Hussein made great efforts to develop democratic concepts and practices in the Leadership and among Party cadres as well as in the Party, Government and unions.

Comrade Saddam Hussein has criticized the trends which unjustifiably tended to impose arbitrary centralized formulas in directing the Party, Government and unions and in dealing with the people. He called for open dealings with the people and for facilitating the choice of leading bodies in the unions.

As for the formula of the people's councils and the relevant tasks assigned by the Eighth Congress, we have to say that this formula was not developed, and that the Leadership had not taken enough care to develop it.

The People's Councils' formula had come at a time when the Revolution was living under exceptional conditions which are mentioned in the Political Report of the Eighth Congress. These councils were formed by nomination. Although their presence in such a form was better than their absence, practical experience has proved that such formulas cannot develop unless they genuinely emerge from among the people themselves.

However, it was not possible in practical and principled terms to establish People's Councils by election before establishing the National Assembly in such a manner.

In 1978, the Leadership ordered that a study on establishing the National Council and the People's Councils and on the democratic management of the State should be prepared. However, the study - which a member of the leadership who was later convicted as conspirator was commissioned to prepare - was deliberately delayed for a long time. Then it was presented to the Leadership which found it so complicated and full of mistakes that it decided to review it again.

After the assumption by Comrade Saddam Hussein of the direct responsibility of leadership in the Party and State, the Leadership decided to go ahead with elections for the National Assembly and to study the formula of people's councils after the forming of the National Assembly. The next phase demands a fresh study of the formula of the people's councils. Their future and role in the democratic practice in the country have to be determined.

As for the unions, their role in society had been enhanced with the progress of the course of the Revolution and with the economic, social and cultural transformations. These organizations have become firmly established as social institutions with a great moral and material influence on the political and social life of the country. Millions of workers, farmers, women, students, youth and others work within the framework of these organizations and practice their democratic rights through elections, thus effectively contributing to the building up and development of the new society. With the establishment of the National Assembly as one of the main institutions of people's democracy, it is necessary not to underestimate the role of unions in the democratic process in the revolutionary society. These organizations would remain and even play an effective role in this process and in the course of development, socialist transformations

and all other revolutionary transformations. In the past phase, there had been a certain progress in the role which the Party Press, the official press and that of the unions had played before the Eighth Congress in criticizing erroneous practices by governmental bodies, expressing the needs of the people and contributing to the argument on the basic national questions. Such a role had been appreciated by the Eighth Congress itself.

The bureaucratic trends which tended to check the role of the press in the democratic process - which the Political Ref of Eighth Congress had criticized - had not disappeared in following phase. However, the role of the press had become more established with the legitimacy given to it by the Eighth Congress and the close attention paid to it by the Leaders!

Of particular significance here is Comrade Saddam Hussein's close attention to this role and his efforts to develop. Indeed, he has even sometimes personally criticized bureaucratic practices and ensuing ills.

The Leadership made an important step along the democratic path and along that of building up a new state when it decided that draft laws and systems should be discussed by unions concerned before being presented to the Revolution Command Council. Moreover, the Leadership took an important initiative in inviting those concerned with new laws systems to attend the National Assembly sessions devotee discussion of such laws. Another one was to prepare working papers in studying important issues with the participation of those concerned in their discussions.

6 - The National Assembly

Establishing the National Assembly was one of the achievements of the Revolution in the field of democratic transformations. The National Assembly experiment was characterizing by originality and innovation.

As we have explained about the Revolution's method of sincerely dealing with the people and in meeting all its promises and commitments, the National Assembly had not been established on traditional or artificial bases.

With its vast popular support, and effective means in the State, unions and media, the Party could have entered a traditional parliamentary election experiment and easily win a vast majority in the Assembly. But the Party opted for another path, that of sincerity and originality.

The number of Party members and independent figures who are loyal to the Revolution, who put up as candidates for the membership of the National Assembly, was more than the number of seats for each constituency. All citizens were allowed to stand for election.

Prevented from standing for election were Communist Party members because of their treachery against the homeland, the people and the Revolution as we have explained; members of puppet and hostile political groups; former members of Parliament during the reactionary royal regime; and those convicted of treason, espionage, dubious connections with foreign bodies and disgraceful crimes.

These restrictions which were necessary to protect the first experiment of parliamentary elections in the country since the 1958 July Revolution had not diminished competition.

On the contrary, competition was so intensive that 840 candidates contested for 250 seats of the Assembly. Candidates were given equal opportunities in publicity, whose cost was met by the State. The Leadership had not allowed any privileges to the Party members or even the Party Command members standing for election. It prevented the Party organizations and unions from doing anything to the advantage of any candidate. It had also prevented State organs from interfering in the elections and stressed that their activity should be confined to discharging their tasks which were defined by the National Assembly Law.

The people's participation in the elections was large and remarkable. The rate of participation in the elections was very high, despite the fact that this was the first experiment of elections, indeed the first real experiment, for more than twenty years; that it was very hot on the Election Day and that certain puppet forces threatened to attack polling centers in the Autonomy Region.

The elections had confirmed the soundness of the Leadership's approach to preparing the elections. Sincerity and good faith in dealing with the people; and considering every candidate as a candidate of the Revolution as long as he committed himself to its main policies and served it and its achievements regardless of his Party affiliation - all this enhanced the confidence of the people in the Party and their support for it.

The majority of candidates were chosen from among Party members. As for independent candidates, they were chosen from among those with best record of struggle.

The National Assembly elections of June 1980 were rightly considered a popular referendum through which the people in Iraq expressed their profound and genuine support for the Party and Revolution and leader Saddam Hussein.

The election process, of course, was not without drawbacks and erroneous practices. In the opening session on June 30, 1980, Comrade Saddam Hussein referred to this frankly, and cast light on mistakes and drawbacks, calling for correcting them and avoiding similar mistakes in the future.

However, such negative aspects and mistakes cannot detract from the democratic value of this experiment and from its remarkable consequences on the relation between the Party and Revolution and the people.

In the past phase, the National Assembly started its tasks in accordance with the law.

Despite the fact that the Assembly's experiment is young, lacking the necessary traditions, and that its practice of its tasks coincided with the start of the war with Iran, it has made active and earnest efforts along the path of democratic practice in a manner consolidating the democratic and popular course in the Revolution's society.

Fully supported by the Party's Leadership and the Comrade Regional Secretary, President of the Republic, the Assembly Members have to expand and deepen their activity within the democratic process and develop their effective contribution to the process of revolutionary construction in accordance with the Assembly's tasks and powers which were defined by its law.

Despite the conditions of war with Iran, the Revolution had fulfilled its promise of establishing the Legislative Council of the Autonomy Region through election on September 19, 1980. On this day, the first Legislative Council was elected. Since the Au-

tonomy Law was issued on March 11, 1974, the Legislative Council had been formed through nomination.

Similarly to the National Assembly elections, the Legislative Council elections were characterized by democratic and free aspects, equality of opportunities for all candidates and large and genuine popular participation. The results of these elections were also another referendum on the connection of the Region's people with the Party and Revolution and the Leader Saddam Hussein, and a referendum on the Revolution's policy in solving the Kurdish question in a sound national and democratic manner.

In reviewing the democratic experiment in the country, it is quite necessary to refer to the special role of Comrade Saddam Hussein in this process especially since assuming the forward official responsibility in the Leadership of the Party and Revolution. Besides his role in developing the democratic practice in the country through his responsibilities at the head of Party and State institutions, he himself has initiated profound, living and genuine relations with the people. Comrade Saddam Hussein allows every citizen to contact him by telephone, receives scores of citizens every week to be acquainted with their problems, visits every corner in Iraq, acquaints himself with the citizens' living conditions, asks them about their problems, discusses with them their views of public affairs, and acquaints himself with the way the Party and State bodies as well as unions work.

This method of direct and living contact with the people cannot be listed within any contemporary method of democracy. It is a method initiated by Comrade Saddam Hussein himself and genuinely connected with his character and his close relation with the people. In some of its aspects, it is similar to the methods of early Moslem Arab leaders in communicating with the people and getting acquainted with their conditions. Of course, there is a difference in the size and nature of society between theirs and the complicated society in this age.

Comrade Saddam Hussein's own method in his relation with the people, in getting acquainted with their conditions and problems and in making living interaction with them, adds a profound and human dimension to the democratic practice in the society built up by the Party in Iraq. Moreover, it helps the Leader and the Leadership to see for themselves the difficulties and conditions which the Party and official bodies may fail to realize and treat.

Through this method, many economic, social and administrative conditions have been reviewed; and many laws and measures of social, economic and administrative nature closely connected with the people's life and their living and social conditions formulated or modified or developed.

Leader Saddam Hussein's distinctive method gives the lead to every official in the Party and State to follow in the living and direct dealings with the people.

Such a method objectively ensures that Party and State bodies and even unions will not stagnate. It also protects them from the diseases of withdrawing into oneself, bureaucracy and erroneous generalizations. Indeed, this method continuously gives these organs a fresh blood and a new spirit in order to be acquainted with the people's conditions and to serve them in the best manner.

Notes

1 - The 1968 Revolution in Iraq, Experience and Prospects, The Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress of the Arab Baath Socialist Party. 1974 published by Ithaca Press, London 1979-p 158.

2 - Saddam Hussein, "One Trench or Two", published by Dar al-Ma'mun, Baghdad, p. 30-31.

3 - Ali Beg Pass is considered to be the most strategic natural borders, not only in Iraq but in the entire World. This Pass has witnessed many fierce battles. The liberation of the pass by the Iraqi Army in a battle for its courage and brilliance led to the defeat of the renegade faction in 1975.

4 - Saddam Hussein "One Trench or Two" pp 38-39.

5 - The 1968 Revolution in Iraq. p. 60.

6 - Ibid., p.160.

Ninth Congress Chapter III

DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION ISSUES

In the introduction to the chapter on the tasks of socialist transformations, the Eighth Regional Congress Political Report said:

"The Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party is a socialist party believing socialism to be a vital prerequisite for the liberation, unity and renaissance of the Arab nation. For this reason, the promotion of socialist theory and values, and their implementation have primacy in its activity at all levels. It seeks to put its beliefs into practice, as the needs of each stage demand, whenever it has the means and wherever possible in the Arab homeland, within a unity-oriented policy. "

Since the beginning, the Party has had its own conception of socialism, asserting the Arab nation's special approach to it.

The special approach does not mean a theory of action and a means of achieving socialist aims and principles which share with other forms of socialism the basics and principles of socialist ideology. Rather, it is a special approach in terms of the principles and ideological conception of socialism, and in terms of how to build it up, (theory of action). Its relation to the internationalist line lies in the notion that every national theory of life has common outlets, views and bridges with other preceding human theories in the world.

The Party has not copied its socialist principles from the Marxist or any other socialist theory. Nor has it sought to imitate any other socialist theory in the world. Nevertheless, it has called for studying all socialist theories and experiments in the world and for creatively interacting with them.

We can say that Socialism for the Party before assuming power in Iraq on July 17, 1968, had not been a theory, but rather one of its basic principles. After the Revolution, the Party had to define its own approach to building up socialism as well as to formulate its own socialist theory that proceeds from the Arab nation's heritage and the objective needs and conditions in Iraq and the Arab homeland.

Despite the delicacy, difficulty and entanglement of the theoretical and practical issues of socialism, the Party has managed to perform this task with relative ease and minimum possible losses. It has also managed to strike a balance between principles and objective conditions. Two factors helped it in this respect:

First: Since the beginning, the Party has, as we have just said, chosen its own approach to socialism. It has not been restricted by any previous formula or restrictions whether theoretical or practical.

Second: The Party has managed to get rid of the erroneous and shortsighted trends surfacing among its ranks in the 1960s during its experience in power in 1963 in Iraq and

Syria and afterwards. Those trends (certain consequences of which remained after the 17-30 July 1968 Revolution) were superficially affected by Marxism. Hence their attempts to impose a dogma on the Party, alien to its principles and nature.

The Eighth Regional Congress dealt with the theoretical and practical issues of socialism as a basic item on its agenda. Proceeding from the Party's principles and comprehensive view, the Congress tackled these issues making a deep, extensive analysis of the economic and social conditions besetting the question of socialist transformations. It has also defined the basic facts in Iraq's political, economic and social progress in depth.

Further, the Congress has laid down for the following phase comprehensive tasks closely connected with the requirements of national struggle on local and Arab levels as well as with the people's interests in Iraq.

It is of particular importance to stress here that while defining certain objectives along the path of socialist transformation and development in the following phase, the Eighth Regional Congress had not dealt with these objectives in a stagnant dogmatic manner. Rather, it has asserted the need to know the concrete reality, to interact with new facts, to strike a balance between principles and objective conditions and to see that the final outcome of the course should enhance and develop the socialist line and ensure its decisive success.

The Achievements of the Past Phase

What are the basic aims and tasks defined by the Eighth Regional Congress in the field of socialist transformations and development? Of these, what were achieved?

Before answering the question, and in order to understand the issue in a precisely objective manner, we have to refer to three essential developments which had taken place between the two congresses:

The richness of the Party's experience in various fields of socialist application and development and the discovery of many new facts throughout the complex course of application — which is an aspect of normal progress, although the party had creatively dealt with it.

The increase in the national wealth at a higher rate than the Eighth Regional Congress had expected, as a result of oil nationalization and the increase in oil production and prices — which had favorably reflected on the process of development and socialist transformation.

Comrade Saddam Hussein's rich theoretical contribution which was demonstrated through detecting and analyzing the basic phenomena in the process of development and

socialist transformation; devising revolutionary solutions for ensuing complex problems; and laying down the Ba'athist theory of action in the field of socialist application.

Eight years after the Eighth Regional Congress and fourteen years after the Revolution, we can proudly assert that the July 17-30, 1968 Revolution led by Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party has made advanced steps along the path of establishing the socialist society in Iraq.

During these fourteen years, Iraq has decisively moved from being a country whose basic wealth and resources are controlled by monopolistic colonial companies and from a society where feudal exploitation, poverty, unemployment and backwardness prevail, to a totally different society.

Iraq has become totally free from any form of foreign exploitation and hegemony over its resources and wealth; and its society has today become free of feudal and capitalist exploitation. Equal opportunities are offered to all citizens, living standards are rising rapidly, and all fields and aspects of life are flourishing.

The objective conditions of exploitation were eliminated with the uprooting of the remainder of feudalism and feudal relations and the State's decisive control over foreign and internal trade.

The Iraqi citizen is today living in a society where he is protected from exploitation whether in work dealings or in the profit made through trade agents' work. The State has provided work opportunities for all citizens. Every citizen can find a job in the State organs. Nor is there in Iraq today, a man who, because of the need to make a living, is compelled to sell his work ability to any other man for an inappropriate return in terms of commitments and rights in any field of economic activity¹.

The Revolution promulgated the law of comprehensive social security providing for families with no definite incomes, and for those with low incomes an additional monthly income, thus ensuring an honorable life for them.

The Revolution has also enacted a law covering the handicapped with the provisions of social security in addition to above-mentioned people. By this law a job is offered in the State organs or in the Socialist Sector's offices to every handicapped person who is able to work and has no constant income. Such a job has to be compatible with his ability and qualifications, in exception to the rules of Labour Law and service regulations. Constant incomes were offered to those handicapped persons, who were not employed. Unemployment has therefore disappeared from Iraqi society. These two new laws of social security will put an end to begging, vagabondage, poverty and want.

Moreover, the state started to provide the basic goods to the citizens, whether imported or locally produced, with prices fixed in accordance with the public interest and that of the citizen, away from exploitation.

Not only were consumer goods provided by the State organs. Many other commodities for various uses and even those termed luxuries were provided at moderate prices.

With the rapid increase in the national income, the Revolution had been eager to raise the living standards of the citizens. This was indirectly demonstrated through developing social security and public services, and producing consumer goods and selling them at prices corresponding to the people's national income; and directly through raising the salaries and wages of those working in all state organs.

Many increases were affected in the salaries and wages of the members of Armed Forces and workers. Some were made on February 8, 1974, the eleventh anniversary of February 8, 1963 Revolution. Several resolutions were issued by the Revolution Command Council effecting wage increases of 9-19 Iraqi Dinars (ID) for members of Armed Forces, civil servants and workers. They have also brought about a cut in the mortgage rates of the Estate Bank; a higher ceiling allowance on taxable income; a reduction in the prices of many goods and services provided by the State for the citizens such as natural gas, petrol, oils, water and electricity supply, with a greater reduction given to rural areas.

Other measures were taken in 1979, on the eleventh anniversary of the July 17-30, 1968 Revolution, effecting certain increases of (ID) 10-17.5 in the salaries and wages of the military, members of internal security forces, civil servants, workers, and pensioners.

The last of such measures was taken in 1980, on the twelfth anniversary of the July 17-30, 1968 Revolution bringing about an increase of ID 20-25 to all those working in the State organs, civilians and military, as well as pensioners. Hence, the total increase in the citizens' purchasing power in the period between the two congresses was ID 40-61.5 which is more than the total salaries and wages of large sectors of the population in the early years of the revolution.

Further, a law was issued to increase allowances for children as well as raising children's allowances for workers, civil servants and the military.

The per capita income in Iraq has risen from ID 91.1 in 1968 to ID 269.4 in 1974 and to ID 666.1 in 1981 with an average rate of growth of ID 19.8 for the period 1968-1974 and ID 13.09 for the period 1975-1981.

This rise in the per capita income was a result of an increase in the salaries and wages of all those working in the State organs. The average annual salary rose from ID 492 in 1968 to ID 609.2 in 1974 and to ID 1517 in 1981.

The average annual wage rose from 228 Iraqi Dinars to 675.4 Iraqi Dinars and to 1617 Iraqi Dinars in the same period. Hence, the average annual rate of increase in the salaries and wages in this period was 100, 187 and 474 respectively.

These increases in the personal incomes have created an extensive and concrete state of prosperity and of advancement in the living standards. The poverty-stricken society

which the Revolution inherited has now become a society of good life and growing prosperity.

In the period 1976-1979, the rate of families whose monthly expenditure was less than 50 Iraqi Dinars had dropped from 11.7 per cent to 2.8 per cent in urban areas and from 37.5 per cent to 12.9 per cent in the countryside⁴.

Against this family budget composition is a rise in the number of families whose monthly expenditure was more than 150 Iraqi Dinars from an average of 12.2 per cent to 45.4 per cent in urban areas and from an average of 7.3 per cent to 8 per cent in rural areas. The number of families whose monthly expenditure was between 51-150 Iraqi Dinars had dropped from 66.9 per cent to 51.7 per cent in favor of the number of families whose monthly expenditure exceeds 150 Iraqi Dinars. The number of such families in the rural areas rose by 55.2 per cent.

The general monthly family expenditure in urban areas rose from 114.1 Iraqi Dinars in 1976 to 166.9 Iraqi Dinars in 1979, while it rose in the rural areas in the same period from 74.8 Iraqi Dinars to 109 Iraqi Dinars. The rate of increase for both areas was 46 per cent. Against this was a price rise averaging 26 per cent.

During the same period, the number of families with electricity supply rose from 94 per cent to 96.6 per cent in urban areas and from 25 per cent to 43.3 per cent in rural areas. The number of families with a private car (except industrial cars and taxis) rose from 10.6 per cent to 12.2 per cent in urban areas, and from 0.3 per cent to 3.2 per cent in rural areas.

The number of families using natural gas as fuel rose from 54.5 per cent to 71.2 per cent in urban areas and from 10.1 per cent to 17.8 per cent in rural areas. Against this was a drop in the number of families using wood from 55.1 per cent to 31.2 per cent.

The Revolution has dealt with the question of taxes in a socialist manner taking into consideration the State's financial resources at every stage of development.

With regard to the income tax, the wife's income has been separated from the husband's and each has become responsible for their own tax. The wife was given the right to incorporate her income with her husband's if such a step will be in their favor.

Income tax on citizens working in State organs and both the socialist (public) and mixed (public and private) sectors was abolished.

These two steps were a great socialist achievement. The income tax legal allowance for the citizens themselves or for their children or those in their charge was raised without limiting the allowance to a certain number of children, as was the case in the past.

Tax on pensions and civilian and military pensioners' rewards, and on profits resulting from the sale of a house, was abolished if the owner or his wife or his underage children

had no other house. Also exempted were the residential plots of land in accordance with the same conditions.

The Leadership of the Revolution and Party has acted in an especially humane manner towards the families of the martyrs of the glorious battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah. It exempted their families from the bequest tax as well as the deeds of cession held by the legal heirs.

The Leadership has also exempted a house the owner of which is dead from the bequest tax, thus proceeding from a scientific and humane view that takes into account the family's conditions and the difficulties it faces in acquiring a proper house for residence.

From a humane point of view, the Leadership of the Revolution and Party issued a law exempting the heirs from any debt accruals to the State except the property of the deceased himself excluding the shares of any underage children and the house of residence.

As for the estate tax, the estates inhabited by their owners were exempted. The agricultural land tax was also abolished for five years and all proceeds were deleted.

Customs on a number of necessary food items were abolished or reduced. Children's milk, for instance, was exempted from customs so as to help reduce its prices as a necessary food for all Iraqi children.

Development of Public Services

Under the July 17-30 Revolution, and in the period between the two congresses: the Eighth (1974) and the Ninth (1982), the Revolution worked along two interrelated lines in this field. The first was to develop basic public services in qualitative and quantitative terms. And the second was to assert a social and socialist conception for public services. In so doing, two great aims will be achieved: developing the country and raising the citizens' living standards in all fields. This achievement was also to be ensured through socialist guarantees protecting citizens from any exploitation.

Education

At all stages, education has become free since 1974. The State has started to offer all education requirements to all students from kindergartens to universities. Also it has been providing free school food meals to all students in kindergartens and primary schools.

A large-scale expansion in this field has been made in line with the requirements of qualitatively building up Man under the Revolution.

The degree of progress of public services in any country is closely related to the living standards of its citizens. The way a state runs public services reflects to a large extent its social conception.

The number of children enrolled at kindergartens rose from 14,500 in 1968-1969 to 35,300 in 1974-1975 and to 76,500 in 1980-1981. In the same period, the number of kindergartens rose from 135 to 203 and to 387. The number of primary school pupils rose from 1,010,000 in 1968 to 1,700,000 in 1975 and to 2,600,000 in 1981. The number of secondary school pupils rose from 285,700 in 1968 to 487,800 in 1975 and to 1,010,000 in 1981.

Vocational education has made considerable progress so as to meet the country's growing needs for middle cadres required for development and great expansion in various projects. The number of vocational schools rose from 36 in 1968 to 75 in 1975 and to 148 in 1981. The number of students in these schools rose from 8,600 to 23,300 and to 53,200 in the same period. Besides, there are technical institutes attached to the Establishment of Technical Institutes, the number of whose students was 23,000 in 1980-1981.

In the teachers training institutes, the number of students rose from 10,800 in 1968 to 14,700 in 1975 and to 29,200 in 1981. The number of institutes became 42 in 1981.

University education has also made considerable advances. The number of students rose from 28,600 in 1968 to 75,000 in 1975 and to 112,400 in 1981. These students study at six universities.

Health Services

There has been great expansion in these services in the period between the Eighth Congress and this one — which shows the concern of the Leadership of the Party and Revolution for providing good health services to citizens with a view to ensuring the proper atmosphere for building up the citizen's character in a sound and vigorous manner. In this respect, the number of hospitals rose from 149 in 1968 to 167 in 1975 and to 203 in 1981. The number of beds rose from 16,300 to 22,100 and to 25,300 in the same period.

Health institutes have been considerably developed. Their number rose from 933 to 1,505 and to 1,745 in the same period. For the first time, popular clinics were established. Their number in 1975 was 55 and rose to 124 in 1981. Such growth in health institutes and hospitals could not be made without similar growth in medical cadres, hence the increase in the number of physicians from 1,759 in 1968 to 4,478 in 1975 and to 5,518 in 1981.

The State health bodies offer free health services to citizens. Nominal fees are sometimes charged just for organizational or administrative purposes. Moreover, these bodies offer medicines to citizens free of charge.

Further, the State ensures that medicines are provided to citizens at prices much lower than those of similar medicines in all countries of the region.

The State provides free treatment in the best clinics abroad for many citizens whose cases cannot be locally treated.

The Housing Problem

This constitutes the sharpest crisis confronting the country as far as living standards and public services are concerned. Its reasons lie in the rise in citizens' living standards, the development in social life and relations and ensuing family splitting, the rapid growth of population, the increase in the number of resident non-Iraqis in the country, and the shortage of building materials compared to the growing needs for such material in this sector as well as in all development projects.

Research in this domain showed that in 1975 the shortage in residential units was 300,000 including 220,000 in urban areas. When we add to this figure the number of units which are below standard, the shortage becomes 566,000 residential units at the end of 1980 including 440,000 in urban areas.

In the years following the Eighth Regional Congress, the State organs, because of certain circumstances and reasons, had committed a grave mistake when they had failed to expand the production of construction materials such as cement, blocks and others. This failure has led to an annual shortage in the production of these materials amounting to 25 per cent.

The funds invested in public services as a whole and the housing sector in particular were relatively small compared to the growing needs in this sector.

However, the construction sector has made considerable progress since the inception of the Revolution. The production value in this sector rose from 98,500,000 Iraqi Dinars in 1968 to 426,100,000 Iraqi Dinars in 1974 and to 3,030,700,000 Iraqi Dinars in 1981, with a rate of growth of 27.6 for the period 1968-1974 and 29.22 for the period 1975-1981. The domestic product rose from ID 36.8 million to ID 155.5 million and to

ID 1645.4 million for the same period with an average rate of growth of 27.1 for the period 1968-1974 and 29.06 for the period 1975-1981. However, this growth was short of meeting all the country's needs in this field.

This was marked as a point of failure in the previous plan. Comrade Saddam Hussein and the Leadership of the Party and Revolution stressed the need to correct this mistake. In recent years, part of this need was met in the last years of the plan.

More funds were invested in public services and housing sector. Work at building new plants for the production of construction materials was started. Imports of such materials were ordered and large-scale facilities in terms of plots of land and mortgages were offered to citizens to build their own houses.

Measures were taken to solve the accommodation problem of foreigners working in companies carrying out large development projects.

However, the housing crisis still exists. Great efforts have to be made to solve this problem in the following phase. Despite the acute shortage, great achievements were made in this field in recent years. Active contribution to building residential units was made by many governmental bodies and projects such as the State Housing Department and the projects of industrial, rural and military housing as well as those of Local Government Ministry.

It is of particular importance to refer here to the fact that the Revolution has so far built scores of thousands of modern residential units in the northern area after the decision to evacuate the border strip of scattered and backward villages. In so doing, the Local Government Ministry has provided new residential units for scores of thousands of citizens who started to live in modern villages provided with all basic services after they were deprived of them in their previous remote villages.

The total number of residential units built by socialist sector was 11,561 in the period 1968-1974, which rose to 96,878 in the period 1975-1981.

The gross number of all residential units built by socialist and private sectors is 172,600 houses and 12,000 flats. This figure includes the units built within the borders of towns and municipalities and built with bricks, cement and rock. According to 1977 census, the total figure of all residential units in Iraq was 798,700 houses and 17,000 flats.

Contributing to solving part of the housing crisis were also the facilities offered by the State in the field of building mortgages—the last of which being the abolishment of interest—the large increase in the Estate Bank's mortgages and the encouragement of building new residential courts. As an indicator of the State's contribution to solving the housing crisis, the total figure of mortgages paid to citizens were 98,100,000 ID in the period 1968-1974 for 74,400 citizens. The figure rose to 1,000,729,000 ID in the period 1975-1981 for 459,500 citizens.

Roads

The State has made active efforts to open new roads around the country especially in the northern area which has not received its share of development in this and other fields of services in the past phase because of the reactionary insurgency. 2,950 kilometers of roads were paved in 1975-1981. 1,242 kilometers of motorways (expressways) and 12,711 kilometers of roads were under construction.

The number of large and small bridges rose from 30 with 3,952 kilometers of length in the period 1968-1974 to 241 with 23,588 kilometers of length in the period 1974-1981, besides other 57 bridges with 12,990 kilometers of length.

Electricity and Water

In the past phase, concrete progress was made in increasing power supply in the country and providing electricity to villages and the countryside which had been deprived of it. Many generating stations were established all over the country. Lines carrying power supply were extended to various parts of the country. The total produced power supply rose from 2,571,800,000 KW/H in 1968 to 3,934,100,000 KW/H in 1975 and to 11,665,300,000 KW/H in 1981. The average rate of increase from 1974 to 1981 was 258.4 per cent. In the same period, similar progress had been achieved in the projects of drinking water in the country. A great number of such projects were completed to bring total refined water from 396 million cm³ in 1975 to 689.6 cm³ in 1981. The average rate of the increase achieved between 1979 and 1981 was 87.9 per cent.

Public Transport

Progress was also made in public transport services — passengers, goods, airways and railways. More transport cars, buses and railway carriages were bought. Airways were expanded and the necessary installations, workshops and airports were established.

In the airways, the number of passengers rose from 1.3 million in 1968-1974 to 4.1 million in 1975-1981. Quantity of goods carried by airways rose from 8.3 million tons to 73.8 million tons in the same periods.

In the field of land transport, the Establishment of Land Transport was set up. In the period 1975-1981 the Establishment's cars carried 29.1 million tons of goods and 9.5 million passengers.

Passenger transport made a considerable progress both in expanding transport lines inside towns or increasing the number of buses used. In the city of Baghdad alone, for instance, the number of passengers rose from 1.1 billion in the period 1968-1974 to 1,854 billion in the period 1975-1981.

The number of passengers in railways rose from 19.6 million in the period 1968-1975 to 23.6 million in the period 1975-1981. The quantity of goods carried by railways rose from 28.3 million ton to 37.7 million ton.

The transport and communications sector has therefore made considerable progress in recent years. The value of production in this sector rose from 110.8 million ID in 1968 to 208.4 million ID in 1974 and to 1,110.6 million ID in 1981, with an average rate of increase of 11.1 per cent for the period 1968-1975 and 26.4 per cent for the period 1975-1981.

However, such a rate of progress is still lower than the general rate of progress in the country. The land transport means, and the public transport in towns including Baghdad are still short of meeting the present needs.

Progress made in railway transport is also still short of meeting the present needs whether in the passengers or goods transport.

Authorities concerned should make more efforts to encounter this problem and overcome the bottlenecks it is causing in the fields of production and services.

Telecommunications

In the past period, telecommunications in Iraq have made certain progress. The most modern and fastest means of telephone lines among main towns were provided through microwave. Good communication lines between Iraq and the outside world were also provided through telestars and telex.

Therefore, it was possible to overcome many aspects of weakness and backwardness which had prevailed in this sector before the Revolution.

The Leadership of the Party and Revolution has shown a great concern for developing this sector. Sufficient funds were allocated for developing its means and installations. Investment expenditure in Telecommunications rose from 13.5 million ID in the period 1968-1974 to 180.9 million in the period 1975-1981. Various services of telecommunications have developed. The number of Automatic Telephone Exchange Centers increased from 22 in 1968 to 30 in 1974 and to 50 in 1981. Their capacity was increased from 76,000 lines to 130,000 and to 350,000 in the same years. Therefore, the rate of telephone distribution (one telephone per 100 citizens) rose from 0.7 in 1968 to 1.1 in 1974 to 3.00 in 1981.

Postal services had also made considerable progress. The number of posted items rose from 110 million in 1968 to 140 million in 1974 and to 200 million in 1981.

Number of telegrams rose from 1.1 million to 1.8 and to 3 million and number of customers of the post office deposit service rose from 140,000 to 160,000 and to 270,000 for the same periods.

Moreover, the Revolution's government has established in the period following the Eighth Regional Congress a number of vital projects which have contributed to developing the telecommunication sector. Among these were three projects of Axial Cables. The first is the eastern with a capacity of 960 channels to automatically connect the Telephone Exchange Centers of Diyala Province with the others in the country. The second is the southern with a capacity of 1,260 channels to connect the exchange centers of southern provinces with others in the country. And the third is the northern with a capacity of 960 channels to connect the exchange centers of Northern provinces with others in the country.

Ten automatic exchange centers with a capacity of 60,000 lines with all their requirements were set up in Baghdad and 11 numbers of provinces.

With regard to developing the country's communication¹, with the outside world, the Ground Station and the international Exchange with a capacity of 204 channels were set up to connect Iraq with a great number of world nations.

The Electronic Telex Exchange with a capacity of 1462 line, as well as Iraq-Syria and Iraq-Kuwait microwave projects with a capacity of 120 channels was completed.

Television communications with the outside world through satellite has also been ensured.

Broadcasting and television communications have made great progress to meet the growing needs in the country (details in Chapter 4 on Information and Culture).

However, despite the fact that what has been achieved in this sector is a great thing compared to its state before the Revolution, it is suffering from certain bottlenecks and still short of meeting the citizens' needs especially with regard to telephone services.

Socialist Building and the Theory of Action

In stressing the need to secure the prerequisites for the transition to socialism and to undertake this transition in all domains where objective conditions allow, the Eighth Regional Congress defined central tasks as below:

"1 - Expand the socialist sector of agriculture (state collective and co-operative farms) so that it becomes the dominant sector; reduce individual types of agricultural production to ensure higher overall production, greater prosperity for the peasants and a rapid transition to socialism.

Bring all external trade into the hands of the state, and impose central control on internal trade, to give the public sector a leading role, while taking account of the urgent needs of the development plan and the special measures these involve.

Strengthen the public sector's leading position in industry, and work with energy and enthusiasm to move it from state capitalist to democratic socialist forms; organize the private sector under firmer State control so that it too may contribute to the development plan.

Guide the public services in accordance with the objectives and demands of development and socialist transformation.*

The Eighth Regional Congress report went on: «In all these fields of socialist transformation, with their connected problems, special attention must be given to economic conflict in the area. Iraq is surrounded by rich countries which follow the capitalist path and maintain close links with imperialism. Given the wealth of these states and the plan of American imperialism to weaken socialism, then eliminate it from the area, the Americans strive, wherever there are sufficient economic and human resources, to build an economy within the context of subservience to imperialism and capitalism, and to pass it off by deceit and lying propaganda as a model of progress. As a result, this region, with its closely interacting states, will experience during the next five years a conflict between this model, based on subservience to imperialism and capitalist methods, and the other model, based on independence and socialist planning. Imperialists and reactionaries in the region and domestic right-wing forces will do their utmost to exploit the mistakes and difficulties arising in the course of socialist transformation in Iraq in order to undermine confidence in socialism. In the struggle between the two camps, living standards and adequate supplies of basic consumer goods will have a central role.

Of course, we shall keep resolutely to the socialist path, in principles and in practice. Our activity must be greatly intensified in this regard, and socialist culture must be extended and deepened among the people. Imperialist propaganda must also be unmasked. But in addition, it is indispensable that when measures of socialist transformation are taken, a careful balance is kept which takes competition into account. In the same way, we must give proof of flexibility in confronting precarious or emergency situations, while being careful to direct the end result of these measures towards strengthening and developing the socialist path, so as to win the definitive victory. "

What are the basic problems and issues which had faced us in the past phase within the process of socialist building and in seeking a theory of action peculiar to us? The periods preceding and following the Eighth Regional Congress were characterized by meticulous efforts to expand the area of socialist sector in various branches of economy, industry, agriculture, trade and services.

This policy was generally correct and necessary. The Revolution's government has inherited a society where feudal and capitalist relations, exploitation and corruption had been prevalent.

In order to change the order of development and life in the country from its previous feudal and capitalist line into a socialist one, it was necessary to stage a persistent socialist struggle in education and in practice and to enhance the socialist line in all areas of economy and in all aspects of life inasmuch as the Revolution's objective circumstances—which were tackled by the Eighth Regional Congress Political Report—permit, even if such a process involved certain mistakes and drawbacks.

The Party had to change Iraqi society in a drastically comprehensive manner into a socialist society. This was what really has taken place in the last fourteen years. However, the Party has not necessarily adhered literally to all those aims defined by the Eighth Regional Congress.

It has regarded those aims as a general policy and a set of guidelines, and not as a fixed formula that cannot be modified. In fact, the Eighth Regional Congress, after defining these aims through the Party's experience at the time, has stressed the essential ends behind them.

Therefore, in the process of socialist building we have to lay stress on those ends—eliminating exploitation and ensuring prosperity, happiness and freedom for the individual and society—and not on formulas achieved at every stage. Those formulas are linked to their time and circumstances, which are changeable. So these formulas are exposed to development, change and adaptation.

The past stage had seen the achievement of a large number of the aims defined by the Eighth Regional Congress and referred to previously in this report. This was done in accordance with the formulas and measures taken by the Eighth Regional Congress. The change and development which occurred to certain formulas had been the result of the three above-mentioned essential developments.

Practical experience and concrete results of certain applications had made it necessary to review such applications so as to correct certain mistakes, avoid certain surfacing bottlenecks which had produced harmful effects to the Revolution and were used by hostile forces to attack the Revolution and the socialist line.

Comrade Saddam Hussein's ideological activity in this period has offered to the Party profound revolutionary, practical solutions for certain questions which, in the past were merely generalized conceptions and principles. At the same time, the increase in the wealth of the country has enabled the Leadership to take unexpected measures to ensure prosperity for the public. This has made it necessary to modify former formulas especially in trade.

The Tasks of the Socialist and Private Sectors

These achievements in expanding and cementing the socialist sector in industry, agriculture, trade and services were very remarkable. Great efforts were made by the Party Leadership, senior Party cadres and national cadres in the State—, who are committed to the Revolution and socialism— who were working in this field. These efforts have led to cementing the socialist line in the country and transforming the old society inherited by the Revolution into a socialist one.

However, beside such positive aspects there were certain drawbacks which caused harmful effects to the Revolution, to its relations with the people and to the socialist line itself.

Proceeding from the Party's revolutionary and objective view and from its desire to establish remarkable, positive achievements and to refer to drawbacks and mistakes so as to correct them and provide a new impetus for the revolutionary course, we have to refer here to the drawbacks in this field, and analyze and find the revolutionary and practical solutions for them.

The Party and its Revolution in Iraq have recognized the legitimacy of private ownership and private (economic) activity within the context of the socialist principles and laws and the supreme interests of the State and society. This was clearly evident in their principles as well as in the constitutional and political documents issued by the Revolution.

The Revolution has been adhering to this. But in the past stage, the bodies concerned in various branches of the economy and public services could not precisely define the separating lines between the activities of the Socialist Sector and those of the private one. Equally, they could not define the tasks of each sector in the process of development, production and services.

This stage had seen aspects of entanglement and inter-connection in the activities of Socialist and private sectors in all domains — which had caused harmful effects to both, confused their relations and undermined confidence between them.

In industry, the State set up certain factories which would have been better run and would have spared the State much effort and funds had they been established by the private sector. In agriculture, the State was almost heading towards involvement in as well as full control over all fields of production. Individual initiatives dwindled and agricultural and animal production sharply dropped.

In trade, the State organs imposed monopoly over all goods in such a manner that would have turned it into a State of retailers as described by Comrade Saddam Hussein. In tourism, despite aid extended to the private sector by the State, government organs started to set up and run small restaurants as well as large tourist camps.

This entanglement in the activities of the Socialist and private sectors, the failure of State organs concerned to distinguish between main and secondary branches and between basic and secondary needs for consumption and development, and the unscientific attempts to expand the area of Socialist Sector — all this has constituted a mistake that expressed the confusion in the application formulas of the Socialist Sector's horizontal expansion. It has also caused harm to the progress of the country besides such negative consequences as the drop in the quantity and quality of production in certain fields and the bottlenecks in the trade sector in particular.

These conditions largely contributed to blurring the growth of the Socialist Sector and to preventing the private sector from discharging its assigned role in the process of production, development and public services.

In industry, the private sector has not made the necessary progress to meet certain consumer needs which the State organs have failed to meet in terms of both quality and quantity. But in construction and contracts, this sector has increased its profits.

One reason was its fear of nationalization in view of what happened before and after the Revolution of July 1968. Another was the theoretic vagueness of the private sector's role from the historical point of view, hence the weak role of this sector in industry and in the industrial-agricultural activity.

In agriculture, the private sector's situation was confused by the State's involvement in many activities and domains where this sector could work much more efficiently. Moreover, the State has exercised total control over the moves of the private sector in this field.

In trade, the country had suffered successive crises and bottlenecks which had inflicted psychological and political harm on the Revolution and its relations with the people. One reason for this situation —which was used by hostile forces (against the Revolution)—was the State's expanded control over the marketing of thousands of basic and inessential goods despite the failure of its organs to discharge such complex tasks. Another was the lack of sound central control over all branches of production, imports and distribution.

In public services, the nationalization of education and the State's control over the health sector were no doubt sound measures. However, the unplanned expansion of the State organs' role in other fields and the failure to pay due attention to the role that the private sectors could take in meeting a lot of rapidly growing needs have checked the growth of this sector in public services. The private sector itself bears basic responsibility for its own backwardness. Certain strata of bourgeoisie and exploiting groups had for many years taken a hostile attitude towards the Revolution and its socialist line. Through various means, they have tried to paralyze the socialist experiment hoping that the Revolution would be overthrown and the country go back to the capitalist system.

The Private Sector, moreover, is backward, selfish and shortsighted. It is always after speedy and fully guaranteed profits. Indeed, this sector is very skillful in accumulating

profits, playing with prices and creating crises in the supply of goods in trade, crafts, and contracts and in industry. It uses facilities and support offered by the State—to enable it to contribute to developing the country—in making speedy profits without making sincere efforts to improve its services or products or even to maintain their prices in a well-proportioned manner.

In all this, citizens, especially those with limited incomes suffer unwarranted harm. In so doing, the Private Sector proves that it is not prepared to make exceptional efforts to develop the country and make profits in the long run. Furthermore, the mistakes of State organs have aggravated its drawbacks.

It is a well-known fact that the Private Sector no longer has any political institutes expressing its interests and stances. Similarly, the professional organizations which incorporate the members of this sector are not powerful or effective.

Some of them, like the Association of Industries, are run by the State in such a manner as would ensure no conflict between its activity and vision and those of the Socialist Sector.

However, the relation between the Private Sector and the State organs concerned has not been organized in a clear, continuing and scientific manner. There were positive political advantages for such a situation, especially during the early stages of socialist transformation and building because the bourgeoisie forces were prevented from possessing polarization centers which might play a hostile political role against the Revolution and its socialist policy. But, from a practical point of view, this situation has left the relations between State organs and the private sector to individuals' vision, assessment and partial knowledge as well as to coincidence.

Another reason for the expansion of the area of the Socialist Sector without scientific measures was that certain State bodies did not correctly understand the socialist principles of the Revolution, imagining that to follow such an attitude (the unplanned expansion of the area of Socialist Sector) was in the interest of the socialist process. Other State organs which had followed this course were urged by a bureaucratic trend for hegemony rather than by socialist principles. Indeed, bureaucracy, as a totalitarian and feudalistic trend, tries with all possible means to impose hegemony on whatever field it may enter.

The mistakes resulting from expanding the area of the Socialist Sector to various fields without drawing a distinction between what is essential and what is not, have not only caused bottlenecks, crises and decline of efficiency in certain branches of the economy, but also had their negative effects on the process of development as a whole and on the main aims of the Revolution on local and national (Arab) levels.

By nature, the Revolution led by the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party in Iraq is not merely a socialist revolution within the limits of Iraq. If it had been so, its tasks would have been far fewer in number and much smaller in size and its problems much less; and we would

have been able to deal with economic issues in a different perspective, not in terms of substance but in terms of prospects, sizes and means.

The Revolution's nationalist nature and its effort to build up a base of support and radiation within the movement of Arab revolution make it shoulder considerable responsibilities and obligations which make it necessary to deal with all issues including the economic one in the same perspective.

It is quite inappropriate that the Revolution should be fully involved in problems of production of soft drinks, sweets and eggs or in building small restaurants —if the Private Sector is able to undertake them— when it has to build up a large and strong army to defend the country and effectively take part in nationalist (Arab) tasks; and when it has to establish a base for military and heavy industries so as to enhance national independence and provide the requirements of nationalist (Arab) liberation battles.

It is true that each one of these activities has its own body, but these bodies are part of the State whose capability of organization, administration and provision of cadres is limited. Its work modes are also restricted by certain measures and scopes. Hence, when it gets involved in running essential and inessential affairs this will obviously be at the expense of the essential ones. At the same time, it will not make a prominent success of running inessential affairs.

Moreover, the size of Iraq's population, 14 million, has to be taken into consideration in dealing with the socialist activity in terms of size, methods and priorities. At the present stage, we can give up many secondary economic activities in the fields of industry, agriculture, trade and services so as to provide the necessary resources for the main branches of economy and for basic national tasks on local and Arab levels.

Such secondary activities can be better handled and developed by the Private Sector. For many years to come, Iraq will enjoy considerable economic resources, thanks to its oil wealth. Therefore, we have to use these resources in meeting the people's needs for consumer goods through the Private Sector or through imports until we establish the main structure of national economy and general progress in the country. For practical reasons as well as those related to principles, the task of building up such a structure cannot be left to the Private Sector. Nor can such a structure be ensured through imports. In fact, neither choice should be made because such a structure provides the basic ground for national independence and sound progress in scientific, economic and technological fields as well as a lever to help the Revolution discharge its local and national (Arab) tasks.

Socialism and Private Ownership

Since the beginning, the socialist principles of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party have recognized the legitimacy of private ownership and private (economic) activity within the

context of socialist principles and laws and of the supreme interests of the State and Society. In principle, this was conditional on the exercise by the State of full control over all basic means of production and basic branches of economy which are closely linked to the essential interests of the people. Also, there should be a guarantee that the bourgeoisie class will not grow along lines of exploitation of the people.

However, in reality, striking a balance in this issue has been a most difficult and complicated job. The Party has to solve the problems and contradictions resulting from such a process.

Throughout the socialist application process in the past stage, this question had surfaced on both theoretic and practical levels. Thanks to Comrade Saddam Hussein's creative ideological contribution, considerable attention was drawn to it, and relevant solutions devised, both in practical terms and those of principles.

The first aspect of this question is a practical one related to the quality of production and services and how much they meet the increasingly diverse needs of the public, in a very complicated age and within the context of competition between the Capitalist and Socialist worlds. Moreover, the large gap between the developed and backward or developing countries (including Iraq and the Arab homeland as a whole) has to be taken into consideration. Should the State exercise its control over all branches of economy and services? And can such a line lead to increasing and developing production as well as meeting the needs of the people?

The experiments which have taken this line have suffered economic failure and crises and a slow rate of growth in most fields of economy and services.

Certain enlightened political leaders in more than one Communist country have tried to ease this trend to face crises and bottlenecks and achieve higher rates of growth and progress, through activating the role of the Private Sector in certain secondary branches of economy and services.

However, such attempts cannot be more than partial measures to deal with economic and social bottlenecks as well as brushing up certain aspects of theory which have come to lag behind present life and its rapid increase in needs and resources. Such attempts are obviously made in the Communist experiments which proceed from a doctrine denying the legitimacy of private ownership and private (economic) activity, and move theoretically towards building up Communist societies based on the theory of (from each according to his work to each according to his need). Hence, it is only natural that we — who proceed from an ideology believing in the legitimacy of private ownership and private (economic) activity within the context of socialist principles and laws and the supreme interest of the State and society—should not commit the mistake of expanding the area of the State's activity to every field and branch of the economy and services and even to their farthest and smallest corners.

The last years' experience in building up a new socialist society (in Iraq) has confirmed this point and the need to avoid such a mistake.

The second aspect of this question, which is a theoretic one related to principles, concerns exploitation. How can we strike a balance between the presence of a Private Sector which does not rely on individual effort and that of the family alone but also on those of many working people, and the need to check exploitation?

It is not easy to answer this question. In fact, there is no absolute answer, because the problem cannot be treated from a theoretic point of view or with a mathematical method. Rather, we have to deal with it in a realistic manner and relate it to man's freedom, happiness and the objective conditions of each experiment.

Before the Revolution, many peasants and workers had been forced to sell their ability to work to feudalists and capitalists within the context of an imbalanced relation, thus suffering exploitation. But conditions totally changed after fourteen years of socialist system in Iraq.

The Revolution has provided job opportunities for every Iraqi citizen seeking a job in various State organs. Unemployment was eliminated forever. Any individual who does not want to work in one of the State organs and seeks to carry out an individual activity relying on his own effort cannot be considered as an exploited or exploiting citizen. But if an individual opted for hiring his own effort to an employer, it is up to him to do so even if the surplus value turned to the employer.

This state of affairs cannot be ensured in all societies. It has been ensured in Iraq, thanks to its economic resources resulting from oil wealth. It would be a mistake not to take advantage of these resources in eliminating exploitation on one hand and guaranteeing freedom to Man on the other. At the same time, we should seek better chances to develop certain branches of our economy and public services, thus meeting the needs of the people for them in a better manner.

It is of particular importance to stress here that those individuals working by their own will for private employers are by no means exploited by those employers.

The State organizes employment affairs, ensuring basic rights for every citizen, whether working in the Socialist Sector or the Private Sector. Minimum wages, working hours and normal and sick leaves are all defined by law. The law protects working people from dismissal unless certain rules are applied.

Those working in the Private Sector are covered by the Social Security Law. They, as all other citizens, enjoy all free services offered by the State in education, health and other fields.

The working people in the Socialist Sector enjoy better privileges than their mates in the Private Sector — which is a further incentive for people to work in the former. One

exception, however, lies in the fact that wages in the Socialist Sector are not subject to the rapidly changing law of supply and demand as is the case with the Private Sector.

It is of particular importance to refer here to the steady decrease in the number of Iraqis working in the Private Sector's industrial, agricultural and services firms to the advantage of the Socialist Sector. In fact, the Private Sector started to meet a considerable part of its needs for work force from abroad.

In an address to certain civilian and military Party organizations on February 16, 1978, Comrade Saddam Hussein has tackled the question of private ownership and private (economic) activity within the context of the Party's socialist principles and the Revolution's process of socialist application. His address which was published (in Arabic) as (Private Ownership and the State Responsibility) dealt with this question in such a comprehensive, creative and deep manner that it has offered a great set of guidelines for the treatment of this issue in the present as well as in the future. Following is the part dealing with this question:

«The slow application of socialism and the failure to discharge its tasks as well as the failure to deal with the private ownership and the private activity with a revolutionary mind and spirit will certainly lead to surrender, shrinking and consequently to apostasy. Unplanned speed in building up socialism, hasty expansion of its fields and the un-objective and unscientific attitude towards private ownership — which has no exploitation— all this can throw the process of socialist application into endless bottlenecks and problems. One such problem is that we would lose many people — which we can avoid. Other problems are the covers and conditions which such measures indirectly provide for apostasy.

Therefore, the problems facing our Party in the process of socialist construction are so diverse and complicated that they need full attention in terms of vision and solutions as well as constant avoidance of stagnant conceptions and treatment. In fact, we have to keep a tight rein on private ownership and business, eliminating any form of contradiction between them and the Socialist Sector and process in general. In this, however, we have to take into consideration not only the material requirements for socialist application but also its human conditions in the first place. In our Party's view, socialism is a philosophy of life fully integrated in all its main and secondary aspects. It is not merely economic treatment and solutions. Thus we will not lose Man, the aim of socialist application.

We are not alone in facing difficulties of socialist application. What we face, in fact, is much less than the difficulties faced in other experiments which had preceded us in the socialist process. Certain socialist experiments suffered grave bottlenecks in terms of development and human loss. Under these experiments, total and hasty (State) control was imposed over all means of production; and full ban on private ownership and business was effected without weighing such steps against the objective and practical requirements of life progress, those of social maturity and cultural and psychological

preparedness, and the serious capability of dealing with socialist construction and the conditions of its progress.

Indeed, during Stalin's era in the Soviet Union, for instance, the sacrifices involved along this course, beside other factors, were about 13 million people and one-third of animal wealth as well as other moral and material consequences. This explains why the Soviet Union has reviewed its position on private ownership which is not exploiting, and why certain Eastern European countries, such as Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary refrained from encroaching upon private ownership.

In fact such a line is easier for the State than our approach to socialism, when the issue is viewed in its direct material context without considering the social and psychological effects as well as the degree of progress. Yet it causes grave harm. The most important requirement of socialist construction process is to control the means of production and turn them into public ownership to a degree ensuring a material base for this process. This should be balanced with the required role of private ownership and activity to the advantage of the socialist process in its comprehensive view of life, its circumstances and successive and developing stages.

This view does not require that means of production and all economic activities should be placed under public ownership; but it does require that private ownership should be placed in the service of general directions and laws of society through socialist construction and relations. It also demands that the size and orientations of private ownership should be determined by the conditions of the (socialist) change.

However, prohibiting and combating exploitation are central to our Party's principles and to all stages of socialist construction and its progress. Equally, our Party is always rejecting and combating those trends which separate private ownership and business from socialist values and consider it as a fixed right that can never be violated or handled under any circumstances.

In our view, private ownership and business should carry out a centrally defined role. Its legitimacy should arise not only from its consistency with the socialist process to build up a new society, but also from being in the service of this process. In fact it should be in full agreement with this process in activities, formulas and aims and inasmuch as required by the nature of the successive stages and requirements of the desired progress and change.

Therefore it is necessary not only to place private activity—which is not exploiting—under the socialist laws and general patterns but also to subject it to the phased policies which would determine its role and size.

The possibility of the presence of private ownership and activity cannot be applied to all sectors and activities in the society. In fact, their area, size and nature should be defined in accordance with the ability of Socialist Sector's organs to practice administration, control and supervision. Also, this should be done in the light of the progress of

technology and science and their relevant effect on this and other fields; and the progress and maturity of society in general. Moreover, this process should be done in the light of the decreasing gap between the need to bring up Man culturally and psychologically along socialist lines, and his ability to discharge and comprehend the tasks in accordance with the process of socialist construction.

Indeed, the role of private ownership and activity should be thoroughly considered. In all this, there should be no generalization, but due attention ought to be paid to the conditions of progress.

Private ownership should not be necessarily equal or similar in all sectors, activities and areas of society. Yet all private (economic) activities should be integrated and coordinated with the socialist public ownership by way of service to society.

Hence, production relations in the Public Sector or the Private Sector, including the cooperative movement, are socialist ones in the socialist society. Despite the presence of private ownership and activity of the type we have just referred to, the system of government is also called a socialist one, when the main structures in the economic, cultural and social fields are relatively stabilized in nature and size, and when the application of basic structures and laws of the socialist process attain to maturity in its particular historical stage.

To allow private activity and ownership within the limits determined by the socialist Ba'athist application and to reject exploitation at the same time, require frequent assessments of private ownership and activity in various fields in terms of type, size and orientation. This should be done in accordance with standards and procedures acceptable to the socialist programme within the successive developing stages of life and its basic components.

Through renewed formulas, the Revolution has therefore, to undertake serious tasks to strike a balance continuously between the requirements of socialist change and those of keeping a tight rein on the Private Sector within the limits assigned to it.

In the agricultural sector, for instance, the size of ownership is changeable. It depends on the development in using machinery in agriculture, the scientific means of combating agricultural diseases, improving and increasing agricultural products and the means of irrigation and desalination. It is also linked to political and social aspects of the Revolution's society. This is why we find that the maximum and minimum limits of ownership in a plot not fully reclaimed or in a piece of land with so much salt that it obstructs cultivation are higher than those in fully reclaimed or fertile plots which are irrigated with water flowing or through instruments. The limits of ownership in an area irrigated by rain are different from those in an area irrigated by water flowing or through instruments.

Hence, we find that the quality and quantity of agricultural products improve when sufficient quantities of insecticides and the necessary means of taking care of plants and

animals, are provided to farmers with low prices, or when the role of the State in this field improves. Such a development would eventually lead to an increase in the value of agricultural production in the plot of land assigned to the farmer in a higher rate than the improvement in this farmer's living and cultural conditions would require in the light of the growth and progress of the whole socialist society including those working in the agricultural sector. Therefore, it is quite necessary to reconsider ownership.

However, such a process (reconsidering private ownership) should not be a continuing one. In the early stages of the Revolution and the development plan, this process is needed particularly for lands whose real value cannot be ensured without a series of technical and scientific measures in terms of reclamation and irrigation.

At any rate, we have to strike a balance in a precise and scientific manner between the above-mentioned requirements and the importance of ensuring relative stability for private ownership especially in agriculture so that those owners would not be concerned for their future.

Those owners, who are not feudalists or exploiting ones, should understand that reconsidering private ownership, in accordance with such considerations, would be always oriented towards more and better advantages for them in terms of living and cultural conditions. In fact, this is an essential part of the aims of socialist construction and struggle.

In considering the highest level of ownership according to its money value, or that of money property, we have to take into consideration the development in the requirements of prosperous life in the socialist conception in the light of the progress on the local, national (Arab) and international levels and the development in the value of currency used as a measure.

If an additional rural residential house is unnecessary now, it will not be so within the socialist ownership in the future. The same applies to ploughs, harvesters and other equipment. This example can be also applied to all other sectors as well as to the general structure of the socialist build-up.

Therefore, in order that our socialist application should be compatible with our basics and theory of action in this field, which do not reject certain socialist forms of private ownership and activity—which are not exploiting—it is necessary to frequently reconsider the private ownership and activity in terms of size, quality, and orientation so as to ensure continuing improvement for the socialist society and prevent the formation of any grounds for exploitation.

In capitalist systems, the State at present, does not undertake the role of the main organizer of economic and other activities in the society. Therefore, its role is limited. The tasks undertaken by its organs in the social and economic life are far less than those undertaken by the State in a system led by the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party. Those systems proceed from the principle: "let him work, let him pass" which means that man should be

able to act freely with the exploiting ownership, and that ownership, in this way, is the central means of life to control society and use the State to serve the capitalist and bourgeois trend.

We believe that the State and its organs should be in the service of society along the course of socialist construction. The capitalists believe theoretically in the neutrality of the State and its organs in the capitalist society. Yet practically, they put these in the service of the private activity, that is, in the service of the exploiting class. In the socialist system, the State serves the majority of the people during the early stage of socialist revolution which often witness a conflict of interests between the remainder of the exploiting minority and the popular majority. And it becomes the State of the whole people, when this conflict disappears and the socialist construction reaches full maturity in its general laws and basic application.

Sometimes, certain comrades and sections of the public disapprove the increase in the number of ministries and governmental organs in our socialist system compared to the number of such bodies during the royal regime or with that of similar bodies in France and other Western countries. In this, they seem to forget one scientific and objective fact, namely that (in our system) the State is basically responsible for running all the society's affairs, hence the expansion in its organs in our system, while the opposite exists in the capitalist, semi-capitalist or semi-feudal systems where basic activities in society are undertaken by the Private Sector and its monopolistic companies. Therefore, the role of the State is limited under such systems.

This clarifies one important aspect of the duties and organs of the State in the socialist Ba'athist society now or along the course of building it up throughout the various stages of development."

Development — the Distinguished Model

The Eighth Regional Congress has called for "a development explosion to ensure the total, rapid evolution of all sectors of activity in Iraqi society and in all parts of the country." It also called for achieving a "great leap forward" in the next five years, "in the economic and social conditions of the country, a leap which will take it to an advanced state of development whereby the foundations of the national economy will be solidly based, ensuring its prosperity. Equally, this stage will lay the foundations of a modern society and establish stable conditions for the people's well-being. During the process, we must be very careful to set an example of how to work for progress and affluence, guided by the principles of the Revolution and socialist policy, in antithesis to the farcical and ineffective experiments offered by certain regimes in the area which have opted for isolationism and imperialist dependence. They have chosen capitalist methods which, throughout the Third World, have proved a total failure"⁵.

This central objective defined by the Eighth Regional Congress had established good guidelines for the process of development in the following stage.

We can say that, under the enlightened leadership of the Party, the main lines of this process remained remarkably close to this objective in practical terms as well as in terms related to principles.

Despite all its drawbacks, this process, in fact, has become a remarkable model for many countries in the Third World, especially oil-producing ones.

What are the basic aspects of the process of development in Iraq under the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and the July 17-30 Revolution?

1 - One of the most important aspects of this process is that it is a national one. In many Third World countries, especially oil-producing ones, development plans proceed along lines which eventually lead to closer economic dependence on developed countries, and big powers in particular and consequently to shackling the national will and independence.

But the Revolution in Iraq led by the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party has adopted a national policy (on local and Arab levels) in the process of development despite difficulties involved.

The rapid and comprehensive development of all branches of economy and all aspects of life in society which has been termed by the Eighth Regional Congress as a "development explosion" and "a great leap forward" cannot be realized through total reliance on national (local) potentialities especially in execution and technology.

Such reliance unquestionably leads to slowing development, losing chances of progress and making improper use of national wealth. Hence, it is necessary to rely on foreign expertise and potentialities in the process of comprehensive development. However, the difference between the policy adopted by Iraq's Revolution in the process of development and those adopted by many countries in the Third World including certain oil-producing countries is that the Revolution has established a close link between the requirements of enhancing national independence and protecting free national will and national (Arab) interests and the development dealings with foreign states and companies. The Revolution has also relied on its own national will in giving priority to certain projects over others, unlike many Third World countries which lack good economists and technicians, firm national political will, and financial resources enough to provide the needed capital. Those countries often submit to the orders of other parties or to their counsel on priorities of projects implementation — which eventually serves the interests of those parties rather than the countries concerned.

The Revolution's attitude towards the execution of development projects in Iraq was essentially based on the diversification of states and companies involved in such process. This attitude is so difficult that the State has to deal with scores of parties instead of only a few. It also causes difficult and complex problems to the bodies responsible for administration, maintenance and assimilation of transferred technology because it brings about diverse modes of such technology, diverse methods of execution in the various branches of development and a large-scale need for specialized and efficient cadres. Despite all this, such an attitude, which is a great challenge in the modern world, offers us better choices, enhances our national independence and free national will and diversifies our access to world experiences in the field of science and technology.

2 - The development plan as a whole is oriented towards expanding and developing the Socialist Sector in industry, agriculture, culture and public services so as to bolster the prosperity of the people. It is a socialist form of development drastically different from the modes adopted by certain Third World countries, including oil-producing ones which follow the capitalist line, although their investments are governmental ones.

In those countries, the process of development is aimed at expanding local and foreign capitalist activities and bolstering their growth at the expense of the people at large. But in our country, the whole process of development is run by the State and the Socialist Sector. In fact, it practically leads to expanding the Socialist Sector and consolidating its leading role in various aspects of life as well as in various basic activities of the national economy. There are, however, a number of joint projects between the Socialist and Private Sectors. The Private Sector and the parasite groups cannot participate in any part of the development plan where the State invests public funds, except the contracts sector and the facilities offered by the State to certain branches of private activity.

Dealing with private contractors' sector has been prompted by the large-scale need for executing development plans. Therefore, it was allowed to expand and make more profits than it really deserved.

However, it remains linked to the State and the development plans. In fact, it cannot have any large-scale activities away from the State's plan and programs. The State determines the size of private contractors' activity because it is their employer.

But there were certain negative consequences for such growth of this sector and the failure of the Socialist Sector to practice its leading role in this field. One lies in profiteering, which is legitimate in legal terms but unfair in terms of principles. Another lies in the negative social effects of such growth.

3 - The Party's conduct of the revolutionary course in the country, including the development process, has decisively and remarkably ensured a "clean" development,

thanks to the Party's profound awareness and genuine principles and morality. In many Third World countries, including oil-producing ones, the development process had led to spreading corruption among politicians and administrative organs as well as to the appearance of groups and bands of suspicious underhand commissions and deals.

The spread of corruption in the development process in these countries led not only to stealing the people's wealth but also to causing deviations in the orientations of such process, meddling in the sectors and projects and grave failures.

"Clean" development does not ensure standards of morality only but also the potentialities of progress based on scientific and objective choices — which favorably reflect on the general line of progress in the country concerned.

4 - The national and socialist nature of the process of development in Iraq and its connection with the national aims and interests made it a comprehensive one. Despite the mistakes and shortcomings in the coordination and integration among all aspects of this process, it has included industry, agriculture, services and culture. Also, this process has covered all parts of the country so as to bring about balanced development in all areas.

This does not mean that there were no priorities in the process of development. In fact, the Revolution has given priority to the industrial sector because it exceeds others in contribution to the general course of progress and evolution in all fields.

Comrade Saddam Hussein referred to this in his book (Our Special Approach to Socialism) saying: "In the considerations of establishing the material base for the socialist application, the industrial sector retains primacy over others." He added: "The world today, as you know, lives in an age of technological and scientific progress. However much a country may advance in agriculture, it will not command the basic aspects of scientific and technological progress when —supposing this is possible— it confines its interest to agriculture.

"Therefore, if our country remains an agricultural one it will remain backward in agriculture in both quantity and quality of production, because it will remain a backward country in scientific and technological terms.

"Our country should therefore be an agricultural and industrial one. Indeed, agriculture cannot make a genuine advance unless our country becomes an industrial one, acquiring the basic aspects of industrial progress. Equally, our country cannot be an advanced industrial one capable of further development in this field without making a close connection between industrial development and the required progress in agriculture."

5 - The Socialist nature of Iraq's process of development and the great attention paid by the Leadership of the Party and Revolution to the life and interests of the people led to exerting serious efforts to reduce the harmful and negative results of such a great process of development, particularly that shown by inflation and its economic consequences, which harm many sectors of the public.

The process of development which is necessary for the progress of society and prosperity of the people cannot obviously proceed in such a comprehensive and rapid manner as that which was carried out in Iraq without causing negative and harmful side effects. One such effect is inflation which has become an unavoidable world phenomenon since the national market is largely affected by world markets.

However, there is a great difference in the level of inflation and its effects between Iraq and other countries, including those in our region. In Iraq, living standards grow rapidly without being corroded by inflation as is the case with other countries.

The "development explosion" is a reality now in Iraq and the "great leap" started many years ago and is still going on. In fact, Iraq is today a large workshop of construction in every field of the economy and in every aspect of life.

This aspect, which has now become a prominent feature in the life of Iraq and its people, is quite well-known to the Arab homeland and the world. Indeed, it has become a well-known fact that Iraq is progressing in a rapid, comprehensive and sound manner. Iraq's experience in development has even become a model referred to by friendly and fair quarters all over the world.

We have referred in this chapter to a number of important achievements in the field of development through discussing the basic aspects of socialist construction under the Revolution together with the prosperity and progress achieved in various fields in the society including the public services. In the following pages we shall sum up the prominent achievements made along the course of development and progress in a number of fields which are central to the progress of the country.

Industry

The Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress has stated that the expansion of the Socialist Sector in industry after the July 17-30, 1968 Revolution was not the result of the nationalization of private industries, some of which were nationalized in 1964. Rather, this expansion was the result of the State's setting up of many new plants. In the light of the vital importance of expanding the industrial sector, and the socialist one in particular, a great meticulous and exceptional effort was made after the Eighth Regional Congress to build up an extensive advanced industry which can contribute to cementing the socialist process in the country as well as establishing the objective foundations of economic independence. Industry is the cornerstone of development and economic independence.

In a world overwhelmed by relations of unequal trade exchange and subservience to advanced countries' economies, national industry should grow rapidly and efficiently to put an end to reliance on foreign sources, to make better conditions for international trade exchange, to speed up the process of development, and to realize economic stability in society.

Despite the great achievements made in this sector during the period 1974-1981, it still suffers from certain obstacles and drawbacks which negatively affect its course of progress and the achievement of the objectives assigned to it. Some of these obstacles and drawbacks are objectively caused by the level of economic progress of the country, the lack of experience in industry and the problems of socialist application. However, the employees of this sector are to blame for other obstacles and drawbacks of a subjective nature.

One important problem facing this sector was the deterioration of its employees' productivity despite the progress it has achieved compared with its level before the Eighth Regional Congress. Among the factors behind such a problem are the following:

1 - The technical inefficiency of the employees of this sector and their failure to keep abreast of recent technological developments. The industrial human base is still below the required standard in both quantity and quality. In fact, great efforts are needed to develop their skills.

2 - The continuing imbalance between middle and engineering cadres both in number and quality — which leads to preoccupying engineering cadres with ordinary technical work and to ignoring aspects of development and creativity in the process of production.

3 - Failure to grasp modern technology to a sufficient degree, and the numerous problems and stoppages faced in operating developed machines and equipment.

4 - The rapid horizontal expansion in many industries without a similar expansion in the preparation of the necessary qualified cadres -- which led to giving old cadres more tasks than they could handle and consequently to decreasing their productivity on one hand, and to giving high industrial positions to inefficient persons on the other.

5 - Despite the acute need for work force during recent years, disguised unemployment is still present in certain branches of this sector, especially among administrative civil servants and to a certain extent among workers and technicians.

One basic problem facing the industrial sector was the imbalance between the size of its horizontal expansion and provision of basic structure projects such as transportation, roads, railways, stores, communications and industrial housing. Despite the fact that important progress has been achieved in these fields, they remained below the level demanded by the high investment rate in industry after the Eighth Regional Congress.

The industrial sector has faced another serious problem which checked the rate of its growth and progress. It is the ambiguity of policy which defines the tasks of the private activity, mixed sector and Socialist Sector. Results of such a policy were as follows:

The Private Sector has kept away from many foods and manufacturing industries which the country is in need of. It has often resorted to profiteering through industry that is to set up small plants which ensure maximum profits in return for minimal efforts. In fact, these plants are no more than large workshops for canning, packing, cutting and similar simple industrial processes.

The Socialist Sector has entered into small, scattered and economically unimportant projects which sap capital and technical and administrative cadres at the expense of vital projects.

It would have been much better if such projects had been left to the private activity, and the Socialist Sector had specialized in projects with high capital and added value as well as in strategic projects which help accelerate the transfer of technology and contribute to speeding up industrialization.

Another problem facing this sector was the lack of awareness and supervision to control the quality of production in the projects of the private and Socialist Sectors. This led to supplying bad products — which made citizens react by preferring imported goods.

The low standard of costing accounts and the lack of its application led to weakening the objective rules of pricing and to an economically unjustifiable rise in the cost of production. This has caused harm to consumers and a drop in the economic profit of certain projects.

These problems and drawbacks had considerable effect on the rate of growth of the Private Sector and on its structural composition. However, these negative aspects cannot detract from the high importance of the development of the industrial sector and its remarkable achievements. Despite the problems of employment, cadres, raw materials and others, the industrial sector met great success in its various branches. This was quantitatively demonstrated by horizontal expansion and qualitatively demonstrated by introducing new industries, and making high increases in the value of production and the added value. Moreover, great success was achieved in building up socialist production relations and enabling the socialist industrial sector to lead the main industrial fields in Iraq — which have helped it lead the whole course of industrialization in the country in a

manner consolidating the socialist revolutionary system and cementing its objective bases.

To have an idea of what has been achieved in this sector as well as showing the degree of attention paid to it by the Leadership of the Party and Revolution, we have to present certain basic indicators of its growth and progress.

In the forefront of these indicators is the increase in the investments allocated for it in the national development plans. Investments spent in the industrial sector were 365.4 million Iraqi Dinars over the period 1968-1974 with an annual rate of growth of 170.8 per cent. They rose to 3832.3 million Iraqi Dinars in the period 1975-1981 with an annual rate of growth of 123.6 per cent.

The State entered new fields of industry such as steel, engineering, electrical and extractive (phosphate and sulphur) industries. Old industries were expanded. Therefore, we can say that during the last thirteen years, a huge industrial base was established in Iraq, thus forming a solid material basis for the socialist society built up by the Revolution.

We can realize the volume of change effected by the Revolution in this field by realizing certain indicators to the growth and development of this sector.

In production, the manufacturing industries achieved clear progress. The value of production had risen from 266.5 million Iraqi Dinars in 1968 to 594.9 million Iraqi Dinars in 1974 to 1797.9 million Iraqi Dinars in 1981 with a rate of growth of 14.3 for the first period and 14.2 for the second⁶. The domestic product in the manufacturing industries rose from 94.6 million Iraqi Dinars to 187.8 million Iraqi Dinars in 1974 and to 594.8 in 1981⁷, with a rate of growth of 12.1 for the first period and 14.03 for the second⁸.

The fixed capital in this sector rose from 36.4 million Iraqi Dinars in 1968 to 123.7 million Iraqi Dinars in 1974 and to 676.5 million Iraqi Dinars in 1981, with a rate of growth of 22.5 for the first period and 18.6 for the second.

In accordance with the strategy of industrialization, the Socialist Sector in this field has expanded and occupied a leading position in the whole industrial activity in the country.

The relative importance of the value of production of the manufacturing industries sector rose from 31.7 per cent in 1968 to 39.3 per cent in 1974 and to 51 per cent in 1981. The relative importance of the domestic product rose from 41.8 per cent to 47.1 and to 56.8 in the same years.

The relative importance of the Socialist Sector's share in forming the fixed capital in the manufacturing industries rose from 50.4 per cent to 97.6 per cent and to 97.7 per cent for the same years.

The wages in the Socialist Sector of the manufacturing industry made a big rise showing the great attention paid by the Revolution to raising the living standards of the employees of the Socialist Sector and increasing their purchase power.

The relative importance of the wages in the Socialist Sector to the total wages in the industrial sector rose from 56.6 per cent in 1968 to 59.3 per cent in 1974 and to 71.9 per cent in 1981. The relative importance of the number of employees in this sector rose from 47.5 per cent to 69.5 per cent and to 78 per cent for the same periods⁹.

Hence, it is quite clear that the predominance of the Socialist Sector in the manufacturing industries field is now established in Iraq. Whatever the Private Sector may expand, on its own or through State's encouragement, it can never undermine the prevalence and control of the Socialist Sector in this field, especially if we take into consideration the nature of the composition of both Socialist and Private Sectors.

The first sector concentrates on big, basic and strategic industries while the Private Sector concentrates on small consumer industries. The Revolution has paid great attention to the mixed sector and ensured all that it needs for development and prosperity in accordance with certain rules that enhance the process of socialist construction, support development plans and speed up the general progress in the country.

Agriculture

Between the two regional congresses, the Eighth and the-Ninth, the Iraqi countryside had seen radical changes in all fields: in production and its relations and in the cultural and social progress.

To a certain extent, the aims defined by the Eighth Regional Congress were achieved. This Congress gave priority to expanding socialist modes of production in agriculture so as to make them the prevalent ones thus eliminating the objective conditions of man's exploitation of man. Also, it laid stress on developing agricultural production and other agricultural services.

Of these aims, what was achieved during previous years has indeed led to the predominance of the socialist modes in agriculture in terms of cultivated plot and production. Agricultural acquisition was reorganized in accordance with the Revolution's socialist line and the scientific approach. Feudal ownership was totally liquidated and the life of countryside population has prospered for the first time, after centuries of backwardness, oppression and exploitation.

However, despite such revolutionary and radical changes and positive developments in this sector, a number of drawbacks and problems appeared. The nature of agricultural sector does not allow rapid and dynamic changes. The heavy legacy of backward habits and traditions in the whole society had a negative effect on the course of revolutionary

transformations in this sector — which was shown by the infiltration of bureaucratic procedures to the ways of socialist application. One result of this aspect was a slow rate of growth in the agricultural production and in the productivity of agricultural employees and land.

Certain problems which had faced this sector were natural and inherited ones, such as the salination of wide areas of cultivated land and the inconsistency of water resources with the seasons of the year. Great efforts and patience are needed to overcome them. I However, other obstacles were the result of certain shortcoming in application. Most important of these were the State's involvement in small parts of agricultural production and the bureaucratic practices of the State's organs concerned — both of which were stumbling blocks to the growth and improvement of production.

Expanding the role of the State in the economic life is an established sound principle in the theory of the Party and Revolution. But what we object to is the extension of this role to smallest parts, to small production and to branches and services where the work formulas of the State cannot respond to practical needs.

Hence, the State should focus on big production, vital projects and infrastructure projects such as those of irrigation, desalination, rural electrification and certain necessary parts of other services in the agricultural sector. The Private activity within a non-exploiting agricultural ownership —which is organized by the Revolution's laws— should be left with free initiative and effective independent work.

Another basic problem facing this sector was the shortage of specialized technical cadres in the field of cooperative work and that of production. The horizontal expansion of the socialist sector and the spread of agricultural cooperatives and farms were not accompanied by a similar expansion in the preparation of specialized cadres.

This problem was further aggravated by the weakness of organizational cadres supervising agricultural cooperatives and the failure of the General Federation of Farmers to supervise their activities and help them solve their problems.

For considerations related to the attitude of principle by the Party and Revolution towards spreading the socialist mode of production, the State carried out certain agricultural projects, in the form of State and collective farms which are economically worthless. Thus, they have burdened the agricultural sector instead of contributing to its development.

These problems and others have to be overcome in the next phase, especially since the working paper on the agricultural sector and the relevant discussion has clearly shown the negative aspects of this sector and the obstacles facing it. The contribution of Comrade Saddam Hussein, the Party's Regional Secretary to these discussions had enriched the paper, corrected its orientation and offered the necessary instructions and genuine solutions which ensure the overcoming of such drawbacks and obstacles.

However, despite the difficult conditions facing the agricultural sector, the recent years had seen important achievements showing the great attention paid by the Leadership (of the Party and Revolution) to this sector to help it overcome the problems obstructing its growth and development.

The Revolution has performed the task of radical and comprehensive agrarian reform. Through such a great revolutionary process, the Revolution started to establish the socialist base in agriculture concentrating on cooperatives and collective and State farms.

The number of agricultural cooperatives (local and specialized) was 1951 in 1981, with 388,500 members and an area of 23.5 million donums (A donum is 2,500 square meters), while in 1967-1968 there were only 410 societies with 55,000 members and an area of 2.8 million donums. The number of collective farms—which were introduced for the first time after the Revolution—was 28 in 1981, with 1,346 members and an area of 143,000 donums. The number of State farms in 1981 was 23 with an area of 767,000 donums while their number before the Revolution—when they were established for experimental purposes—was 5 with an area of 167,000 donums.

What has been achieved is a clear indication that the socialist base in the Iraqi countryside was established, and that feudalism, its material base and social influence were eliminated.

The social influence retained by some feudalists resulting from their tribal positions cannot seriously contravene or upset the course of the Revolution. In the field of changing the methods and relations of production, the Revolution has re-organized agricultural acquisition and its size in the countryside in accordance with the aims of building up a socialist countryside.

By the two Agrarian Reform Laws, 117 of 1970 and 90 of 1975, it was possible to reorganize agricultural acquisition and totally eliminate feudal and big exploiting ownership. The small acquisition (less than 10 donums) has become 2.8 per cent of the total agricultural acquisitions, with an area of 692,000 donums and 157,000 usufructuaries. The middle acquisition (10-20 donums) has risen to 66.47 per cent with an area of 16.4 million donums and 492,300 usufructuaries. The big acquisitions (120-300 donums) have become 16.9 per cent with 4.1 million donums and 28,300 usufructuaries. Those acquisitions of more than 300 donums—often in rain-irrigated areas—have become 13.7 per cent with an area of 3.4 million donums and 5214 usufructuaries.

It is easy to show the volume of change effected by the Revolution in this vital field of economic and social activity, by referring to certain indicators of its growth and progress.

The final expenditure of investment in this sector had risen from 239.3 million Iraqi Dinars in the period 1968-1974 to 2029.6 million Iraqi Dinars in the period 1975-1981.

The value of production had made similar progress. It rose from 200.8 million Iraqi Dinars in 1968 to 354.9 million Iraqi Dinars in 1974, and to 1280.1 million Iraqi Dinars in 1981, with a rate of growth of 9.9 for the period 1968-1974 and 22.1 for the period 1975-1981.

The domestic product in agriculture made clear progress. It rose from 167.9 million Iraqi Dinars in 1968 to 278.4 million Iraqi Dinars, in 1974, and to 977 million Iraqi Dinars in 1981 with a rate of growth of 8.8 for the period 1968-1974 and 20.9 for the period 1975-1981. The fixed capital in the agricultural sector rose from 16.8 million Iraqi Dinars to 47.8 million Iraqi Dinars and to 468.3 million Iraqi Dinars in the same years with a rate of growth of 19 for the period 1968-1974 and 35.4 for the period 1975-1981. The Socialist Sector's role in agriculture has made great progress as a result of the Revolution's socialist policy, its persistent endeavour to enhance the Socialist Sector in agriculture, the re-organization of agricultural acquisition, the liquidation of feudal ownership, the distribution of land to farmers, and the introduction of socialist modes to agricultural production.

This was clearly demonstrated by the relative importance of this sector's contribution to the value of production, the gross domestic product and the fixed capital in the whole agricultural sector.

Its contribution to the value of agricultural production rose from 1.4 per cent in 1974 to 43.4 per cent in 1981. The relative importance of the Socialist Sector's contribution to the domestic product in the whole agricultural sector rose from 0.3 per cent in 1968 to 0.7 per cent in 1974 and to 49.4 per cent in 1981.

The agricultural sector maintained a semi-stable rate of cultivated land despite the fluctuation of this rate in certain years. The area of cultivated land rose from 9.2 million donums in 1975 to 10.7 million donums in 1981. The agricultural sector has maintained the general level of production. It even made an increase from 3.2 million tons in 1975 to 11.1 million tons in 1981 in vegetables¹¹. It also produced 558,000 tons of animal products and 933 million eggs.

This increase in production is due to a relative improvement in the efficiency of agricultural exploitation and to a rise in productivity. Despite the fluctuation of the gross area of cultivated land in recent years, the level of production was maintained, and a certain rise was achieved.

Modern methods were introduced into agriculture on a large-scale. Covered agriculture, and plastic and glass houses were used. Pioneering agriculture was expanded. The State has offered necessary services to agricultural production such as seeds, chemical fertilizers, agricultural credits, marketing, agricultural instructions, protection of plants and medical care to animals. These services were offered either free of charge or at low prices.

The role of the socialist sector in marketing agricultural products has also expanded. The total weight of marketed goods through this sector was 1.1 million tons in 1981 while it was only 3700 tons in 1968.

The State has extended great financial support to farmers to help them cultivate their land, develop their productive firms and use machinery. The Cooperative Agricultural Bank took an important role in this respect by offering credits to farmers. While the total sum of credits offered to peasants in the period 1968-1974 was 25.4 million Iraqi Dinars, it rose in the period 1975-1981 to 372.1 million Iraqi Dinars. This rise in the Agricultural Bank's services was accompanied by a rise in its capital from 10 million Iraqi Dinars in 1968 to 15 million Iraqi Dinars in 1974 and to 300 million Iraqi Dinars in 1981.

The Revolution has paid considerable attention to soil reclamation. Much was spent on this field. Until the end of 1974, the total reclaimed area ready for cultivation, was 28000 Donums while it had risen to 524000 Donums by the end of 1981.

Irrigation projects and dams have drawn certain attention in recent years with the purpose of regulating the exploitation of water resources in the country and expanding the area of irrigated plots. Hamrin Dam and six other dams in the western desert, including that of Rutba, were so far built. The Tharthar—Euphrates canal was also built. In progress are construction works in Tharthar-Tigris canal and in the dams of Haditha, Mosul and Dohouk. Work has started on a number of irrigation and desalination projects. Some were finished, such as those of Khalis, Kirkuk, Hilla-Diwaniya, Dijaila, Dalmaj, Roz, Abu-Ghraib, Ramadi and Ishaqi. The first stage in the desalination of the General Drain was accomplished. Seven weirs were built on Tigris River in Meisan Province and seven other weirs were built on the rivers of Hilla and Daghara. Work has started in the Fallouja Dam.

However, the agricultural sector has not made the necessary progress in increasing the area of cultivated land and its productivity. There are many reasons for this, other than the above-mentioned ones. These are totally different from the inherited objective legacy which contributed to slowing the growth and development of the agricultural sector. They are the outcome of the general progress achieved under the Revolution in various fields of the society and the national economy. This progress has left social and psychological effects on the people working in agriculture affecting their production and activity.

Among these factors are the following:

- 1 - The "great leap" in development cannot be achieved without large-scale employment. Despite the great number of Arab and foreign employees working in Iraq, large numbers of farmers were still needed to work away from law regulations which do not allow farmers to change their career. This was done through various forms with foreign companies and local private employers.

2 - Many elderly peasants preferred to rest after their children had graduated from colleges and schools or joined the army, thus leaving agricultural work, in a form of protest against former harsh conditions.

3 - The peasants' cultural level remained lagging behind the living conditions of State's employees to which the Revolution had affected a great rise. Therefore the old peasant has become content with his children's income compared with his earnings from agriculture in the past, thus losing the motive to work in agriculture.

4 - The Revolution has made exceptional efforts to uproot all aspects of social backwardness in the Iraqi countryside, through expanding television transmission, the activities of the branches of the Party and Unions among farmers, the application of obligatory education and literacy, and the building of many roads to link urban and rural areas. However, the degree of social change is slower than that in economic, technological and scientific fields. A certain span of time should pass before the Revolution's achievements in this field come to fruition. This fact has obviously left its effect on the growth of the agricultural sector. It has multiplied the pressures on this sector as a result of rising demand on food and industrial crops. Moreover, this sector has failed to cope with the level of general progress in the country.

Trade

After the Revolution and particularly after the Eighth Regional Congress, the socialist sector in trade had seen great expansion. Two factors lie behind such expansion:

The big increases in national income and the growing need for imports whether for the purpose of extensive development plans or for growing and developed consumption.

The growing activity of the socialist sector in trade.

The large increases in the allocations of imports programs show the progress made by external trade under the national economy. They also show the great qualitative achievements made in the various fields of development as well as the rise in the citizens' living standards.

These allocations had risen from 1805.1 million Iraqi Dinars in 1974 to 5523.4 million Iraqi Dinars in 1981. There was certain progress in the structural composition of imported goods indicating the coordination and interaction between the imports programs and the

development plans. It also shows how, under our Party's socialist experience, imports were placed in the service of comprehensive development and the consolidation of the process of socialist construction and people's prosperity.

The rate of capital and medium goods in the imports programs has made a clear rise as a result of the increase in the development investments and the growing need of various projects for such goods. Such an aspect underlined the difference between our development process and those of other countries with similar financial conditions. In their imports programs, those countries would give priority to consumer goods — which corresponds to their policies of seeking to build consuming societies rather than societies based on development and structural change of their economic and social reality.

The rate of capital and medium goods in the imports programs rose from 60.7 per cent in 1968 to 78.8 per cent in 1974 and to 79 per cent in 1981. Against this was a drop in the rate of consumer goods from 39.3 per cent to 21.2 per cent and to 21 per cent in the same periods. This drop was the result of the growing ability of local production to meet part of the local demand for these goods. We have to remember, though, that this drop took place despite the great increase in the goods imported to meet the citizens' growing needs, resulting from the increase in their spending power and the rise in their living standards.

This obviously demonstrates the effective role of imports programs in serving development plans and meeting their needs for machines, instruments and raw and medium materials.

This qualitative change in the composition of imports was accompanied by similar development in the wholesale and retailing trade sector. The value of production in this sector rose from 113 million Iraqi Dinars in 1968 to 213.4 million Iraqi Dinars in 1974 and to 1257.5 million Iraqi Dinars in 1981, with a rate of growth of 11.1 for the period 1968-1974 and 27.8 for the period 1975-1981. The gross domestic product of this sector rose from 86.9 million Iraqi Dinars in 1968 to 168.9 million Iraqi Dinars in 1974 and to 851.2 million Iraqi Dinars in 1981, with a rate of growth of 11.7 for the period 1968-1974 and 26.4 for the period 1975-1981.

In the context of consolidating the socialist line of the Party and Revolution in this field and to put an end to the parasitic phenomena which prevailed in some of its fields and activities, the Revolution paid special attention to helping the socialist sector lead this important activity and place it at the service of the public and their needs as well as in the service of the development process and its programs.

The relative importance of the Socialist sector's contribution to the gross domestic product of the trade sector was 12.08 per cent in 1968, 51.3 per cent in 1974 and 52.3 per cent in 1981, while its contribution to the formation of the fixed capital was 57.5 per cent, 87 per cent and 90.3 per cent for the same years.

The imports allocations for this sector were more than 90 per cent of the total imports allocations. It has been 92.9 per cent in 1974 and 91.4 in 1981.

Another evidence of the development of the socialist sector was its growing role in the domestic trade. The State has become directly involved in selling basic and secondary goods as well as in controlling the marketing of locally manufactured goods as well as local and imported agricultural and animal products. In the last period, the socialist sector has opened more retailing showrooms and increased the number of its agent-retailers so as to expand the area of domestic distribution of goods.

The number of State-run retailing showrooms rose from 59 in 1970 to 171 in 1974 but dropped to 122 in 1981 as a result of the Leadership's instructions not to open more such showrooms and concentrate, instead, on getting more agent-retailers. At the same time the number of shopping centers increased to 16 in 1981.

The number of the Socialist Sector's agent-retailers rose from 24301 in 1970 to 50980 in 1974 and to 126592 in 1981. The branches of this sector's companies rose to 123 in 1981.

The exports' gross value and relative importance remained low out of all proportion to the volume of imports as well as to the progress of other branches of the national economy. Non-oil exports had risen from 22 million Iraqi Dinars in 1968 to 28 million Iraqi Dinars in 1974 and to 73 million Iraqi Dinars. Their relative importance to the total imports was 15.3 per cent, 3.6 per cent and 2 per cent in the same years.

The main reason for the slow growth of Iraqi exports lies in the steadily growing final local demand since 1974. Therefore the greater part of the increase in national production was oriented towards meeting local demand instead of being exported. Despite the legitimacy of this reason, we have to plan for increasing non-oil exports through building up export industries. In fact, we have to take into account the number of Iraq's population and the need to define priorities in executing projects giving priority to agricultural and industrialized-agricultural production whenever a chance was available so as to decrease reliance on oil revenues and world market as well as effecting a concrete change in the structural composition of the national economy. However, this should not be done at the expense of our attention to priorities which occupy a prominent place in our strategic considerations. We can generally say that the past phase had seen an almost full control of the socialist sector over external trade and large-scale control over internal trade.

The National Economy

In the last fourteen years, the national economy has made great strides towards the objectives set by the Leadership of the Party and Revolution.

Through reviewing what has been achieved in the main sectors, we can say that the Iraqi economy has developed in two basic lines:

First: Making material progress in the basic branches of economy shown by the large investments, the high rates of growth of the value of production and the domestic product, and the new fields of production and services it has entered.

Second: Expanding the area of socialist sector and giving it primacy ensuring the promotion of socialist relations of production in various activities of national economy. Along these two lines, the national economy has achieved good results. The value of production had risen from 1487.2 million Iraqi Dinars in 1968 to 4883.7 million Iraqi Dinars in 1974, and to 14492.2 million

Iraqi Dinars in 1981, with a rate of growth of 21.9 for the period 1968-1974 and 17.05 for the period 1975-1981¹³. The domestic product had risen from 1034.5 million Iraqi Dinars in 1968 to 3522.6 million Iraqi Dinars in 1974, and to 9495.2 million Iraqi Dinars in 1981, with a rate of growth of 22.6 for the period 1968-1974 and 15 for the period 1975-1981¹⁴. The gross formation of fixed capital had risen from 143 million Iraqi Dinars to 628.6 million Iraqi Dinars and to 4527.3 million Iraqi Dinars in the same periods.

The Socialist Sector's contribution to the whole national economy has made a big rise. Its contribution to the gross domestic product rose from 24.5 per cent in 1968 to 68.1 per cent in 1974, and to 60.3 per cent in 1981¹⁵ in the same periods. The national income rose from 812.5 million Iraqi Dinars in 1968 to 2916.5 million Iraqi Dinars in 1974 and to 9147 million Iraqi Dinars in 1981¹⁶. The per capita income rose in the same periods from 91.8 Iraqi Dinars to 269.4 Iraqi Dinars and to 666.1 Iraqi Dinars which matches the per capita in many industrialized countries.

The Tasks of the Next Phase

The process of socialist construction and development in Iraq under the July 17-30, 1968 Revolution and the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party has been a glorious one. It has achieved a great deal of its aims despite the difficulties, drawbacks and bottlenecks which were treated in this report in a revolutionary and objective manner. In this, the Report has proceeded from the principle of self-criticism adopted by the Party in its course and close relation with the people. In fact, this process has drastically transformed Iraq from an age of feudal and capitalist exploitation, corruption, injustice, poverty and backwardness to a totally new age of freedom, equality, justice, prosperity and progress in all fields. The process of development and socialist construction has not achieved all its objectives. It is a continuing process. At every stage there will be basic tasks to be performed with a view to bringing about happiness, prosperity and justice to Man in our country, to offering a bright model in the movement of Arab revolution, and to creatively contributing to the progress of Mankind towards freedom, justice and happiness.

What are the basic aims and tasks facing us in the next phase?

In this Congress, as was the case with the Eighth, we have to define aims and tasks in a revolutionary and creative manner. We should not confine ourselves to formulas and solutions which we have reached in a particular stage as a result of the experience we had then acquired and the facts we had then discovered. The fact that Party and our course of struggle have always underlined is that we have to adhere firmly and profoundly to principles and to direct the outcome of every course we lead towards the basic national principles and aims on both local and national (Arab) levels.

In the next phase hard and creative work should continue so as to expand and develop the socialist base in all fields of economy: in industry, economy, trade and services.

We have to keep on expanding the industrial base through completing industrial projects which the Revolution has already started, and to enter the new basic fields.

The final objective is to transform Iraq in the first place into an industrial country, meet the main needs of the country through national production and link the industrial set-up in the country with the Arab industrial integration in accordance with the Party's principle of Arab unity.

In the forefront of such tasks is to effect qualitative development in industry, an increase in production, a better use of machines, a creative assimilation and adaptation of transferred technology according to the conditions of the country and our national needs on local and Arab levels.

We have to make serious and extensive efforts to solve difficulties in industrial production and regulate the flow of raw materials concentrating on what is locally produced. Serious attention must be paid to the economic aspect of industrial projects. We do not obviously deal with industrialization from a capitalist point of view of profit, since we link it closely to the course of general progress in the country and the desired prosperity of the people. However, this is no justification for paying no attention to developing the profitability of industrial projects so as to provide financial accumulation needed for meeting the needs of the public and developing the socialist society.

The socialist sector in industry which, in recent years has been and will continue to be the prevailing sector in the society should give the lead in efficiency, progress and good management.

In agriculture, the next stage requires further efforts to develop the socialist sector avoiding any horizontal expansion except in fields and projects which are well-calculated to serve the process of socialist transformation and of increasing and developing production. This stage should also see the application of the recommendations taken in discussing the working paper on the prospects of developing the agricultural sector. It is of particular importance to carry out Comrade Saddam Hussein's instructions which stressed the need to effect an extensive change in the agricultural sector's course and to draw up its next five-year plan in a more comprehensive and organized manner avoiding the negative aspects surfacing in its past course, so as to ensure the desired ends.

The productivity of the socialist agricultural sector's projects which was low in the past stage should be raised in the next stage. Efforts should be made to develop administrative and scientific means used in agriculture, liquidate bureaucratic practices in this field and put the potentialities of its employees to a good use.

In the forefront of the tasks facing us in agriculture is that of continuing our meticulous efforts to reclaim land, to build up irrigation projects and modern agricultural-industrial complexes and to develop the use of machinery in agriculture.

The Party, the General Federation of Farmers' Societies and the State's organs concerned have to continue working for developing the farmers' cultural and social conditions. Any step forward in this respect—which must be linked to the agricultural production—will consolidate such production in qualitative and quantitative terms.

Meeting our needs for food with national production will be one of the basic aims facing us in the next phase. To continue importing many basic and inessential commodities such as grains, vegetables, fruit and meat is a failure which we should ensure is totally or partly averted in the next stage.

Self-sufficiency in food is no longer an economic issue. Rather it is now linked to the issues of national independence and sovereignty. This link will become even closer with the growing world need for food.

In trade, the socialist sector should work hard to develop its bodies and enhance their capability of supplying basic and other commodities at appropriate prices in accordance with the Leadership's central plans. There must be an end to all bottlenecks which surfaced in the past phase. The public should be able to get what they need easily.

The socialist sector in trade has reached the desired level of horizontal expansion in this stage. However, this does not mean that its services should not develop and expand where it is necessary. The country is still in need of better services in this field.

In the public services sector, we have to make extensive progress in qualitative and quantitative terms. This sector has not received due attention and a proper share in the investments of the development plan because of the State's concentration on other sectors especially agriculture and industry. A great effort should be now made to develop this sector and big investments should be made in it.

We should not consider public services as a secondary issue. The Revolution has succeeded in establishing the industrial base and meeting a great deal of basic needs. It is therefore necessary to expand and develop these services in accordance with the financial resources.

The main question to be dealt with in this sector is housing. Despite the main obstacles to development in this field, we have to work hard and invest more to ensure proper housing for the public.

We also have to expand municipal services in towns and the country-side. An exceptional leap forward in this field has become urgently needed to take the whole country out of the conditions of backwardness and place it on the threshold of more extensive progress.

The State has to continue its meticulous efforts to introduce electricity and drinking water to all rural areas. It should continue building new schools and developing existing ones as well as building new hospitals and clinics and developing their services.

Work should continue in a serious and active manner to expand national roads networks as well as rural roads. We also have to develop transportation, especially railways, land, river and airway transportation among the country's main cities and centers. Telecommunications should be further developed so as to cover all the country thus meeting the needs of development and social progress in the country.

We have to continue working to provide tourist facilities all over the country and develop existing ones so as to provide better tourist services to the public. It is also necessary to make great efforts and sufficient investments to provide public parks and gardens, pools, children's playgrounds and others.

The plan to develop services on a large scale requires a comprehensive reform of the bodies concerned and a general review of their connections with central organs. Provision and administration of services should be decentralized. Mayors of Provinces and municipalities should be given the necessary power to carry out and run service projects.

It is of particular importance to stress here individual contributions to developing public services. The public are called upon to cooperate with the bodies concerned, facilitate their tasks and abide by their regulations, especially in health, education, literary, transportation, tourist facilities and others. These important objectives should be achieved in the next phase in the light of the economic position of the country under the conditions of the war launched by Iran. These conditions may take a short or long time. However, we have to seek these essential objectives as soon as financial resources are available.

Notes

1 - The Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress said: «The fundamental aim of socialism is to eradicate exploitation, to establish social justice, and to secure for the people the greatest prosperity possible at the time in the circumstances, and in accordance with national interests. The considerable increase in national income achieved under the Revolution, through its policy of progress, liberation and development, especially the victory over the monopolies in the battle for nationalization, makes it necessary for us now to effect a big rise in the people's standard of living: wages and salaries must be increased, taxes must be reduced; rates for basic services such as water and electricity must fall; free education must be provided at all stages; services such as health and housing must be guaranteed and other measures taken as resources and conditions allow.

Prices must be fixed for commodities basic to the life of the great majority and other prices must be regulated.

2 - In 1980 the per capita income was 998 Iraqi Dinars but dropped in 1981 as a result of the decline in oil production after the war waged by Khomeini's regime against Iraq.

3 - The Eighth Regional Congress Report published by Press, London, 1979, pp 165-166.

4 - The last available study on family's budget covers the period 1976-1979. The study covering the next period is not ready yet.

5 - The Eighth Regional Report, published by Press, London, 1979, pp.165-166

6 - The drop is a result of the effect that the war with Iran had on the 1981 rate. But if we take the period 1975-1980, the rate will be 16.1 per cent.

7 - 1981 figure is an approximate one.

8 - This drop is a result of the effect of the war with Iran on the last year of the period 1981. This becomes quite clear if we take the rate of growth of the period 1975-1981 which is 18.47 per cent.

9 - These figures are for large plants

10 - The 1968 figure is not available because there was no effective socialist sector then.

11 - This includes grains, industrial and oil crops, vegetables, dates and provender.

12 - This includes red and white meat, milk, wool and hair.

13 - This drop is due to the 1981 rate which has dropped because of the war conditions. If we exclude 1981, the 1975-1980 rates will be 25.12. 14 If we exclude 1981 the rate will be 26.8.

14 - This drop is due to the drop in oil production after the start of the war.

15 - The approximate figure of the national income in 1981 was 13173.6 million Iraqi Dinars.